From owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Thu Apr 24 06:43:58 2014 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [8.8.178.115]) (using TLSv1 with cipher ADH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 925C04ED; Thu, 24 Apr 2014 06:43:58 +0000 (UTC) Received: from csmtp14.one.com (csmtp14.one.com [195.47.247.114]) (using TLSv1 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4F64F1D41; Thu, 24 Apr 2014 06:43:57 +0000 (UTC) Received: from [172.20.10.3] (94.191.184.93.mobile.3.dk [94.191.184.93]) by csmtp14.one.com (Postfix) with ESMTPA id 15628400000EE; Thu, 24 Apr 2014 06:34:01 +0000 (UTC) Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 7.2 \(1874\)) Subject: Re: OpenSSL static analysis, was: De Raadt + FBSD + OpenSSH + hole? From: Erik Cederstrand In-Reply-To: <20140424000744.GE15884@in-addr.com> Date: Thu, 24 Apr 2014 08:33:58 +0200 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: <9330A007-63D2-4930-AB33-4EEE64AEF670@cederstrand.dk> References: <10999.1398215531@server1.tristatelogic.com> <50CA7E78-BB5E-4872-A272-B7374627EC12@cederstrand.dk> <546CE3A8-FC87-472F-8A63-0497D0D28789@cederstrand.dk> <20140424000744.GE15884@in-addr.com> To: Gary Palmer X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1874) Cc: "freebsd-security@freebsd.org" X-BeenThere: freebsd-security@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.17 Precedence: list List-Id: "Security issues \[members-only posting\]" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 24 Apr 2014 06:43:58 -0000 Den 24/04/2014 kl. 02.07 skrev Gary Palmer : >=20 > I also think we're getting off topic. Any concrete steps people are > willing to take to make FreeBSD more secure? Well, the static analysis reports aren't totally useless, but we need = some way of marking them as false positive or wontfix, so the effort = isn't duplicated. Out of the 10.000 reports, a conservative guess is = that at least 100 of them are real security issues. And they are public, = so Mallory can just pick one now and write an exploit. A year ago, I did = a raid on reports about not checking the return value of setuid() and = friends, which did uncover real issues. Erik=