From owner-freebsd-security Wed Nov 17 13:12:49 1999 Delivered-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Received: from green.myip.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 42CA414EC7 for ; Wed, 17 Nov 1999 13:12:14 -0800 (PST) (envelope-from green@FreeBSD.org) Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] ident=green) by green.myip.org with esmtp (Exim 3.02 #1) id 11oCIN-000Iyf-00; Wed, 17 Nov 1999 16:07:16 -0500 Date: Wed, 17 Nov 1999 16:07:14 -0500 (EST) From: Brian Fundakowski Feldman X-Sender: green@green.myip.org To: Matthew Dillon Cc: Kelly Yancey , freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: kernel stack contents visible from userland In-Reply-To: <199911171727.JAA64140@apollo.backplane.com> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Sender: owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk X-Loop: FreeBSD.org > Since the kernel stack is per-process, I don't think there is any > security concern. But you've definitely uncovered an undesired > trait so I think your patch is a good one. > > -Matt > Matthew Dillon > I'd be more inclined to, in any case, zero the memory. If you return a struct, you should be able to know exactly whether or not X data-field is valid. You can't do this if parts contain "random" memory. -- Brian Fundakowski Feldman \ FreeBSD: The Power to Serve! / green@FreeBSD.org `------------------------------' To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message