From owner-freebsd-ipfw@FreeBSD.ORG Wed Jul 2 16:42:48 2003 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-ipfw@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.FreeBSD.org (mx1.freebsd.org [216.136.204.125]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F0DFC37B404 for ; Wed, 2 Jul 2003 16:42:47 -0700 (PDT) Received: from laptop.tenebras.com (laptop.tenebras.com [66.92.188.18]) by mx1.FreeBSD.org (Postfix) with SMTP id 1EFAB43FFB for ; Wed, 2 Jul 2003 16:42:47 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from kudzu@tenebras.com) Received: (qmail 22638 invoked from network); 2 Jul 2003 23:42:46 -0000 Received: from sapphire.tenebras.com (HELO tenebras.com) (192.168.188.241) by 0 with SMTP; 2 Jul 2003 23:42:46 -0000 Message-ID: <3F036DEE.8010408@tenebras.com> Date: Wed, 02 Jul 2003 16:42:38 -0700 From: Michael Sierchio User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i386; en-US; rv:1.3.1) Gecko/20030425 X-Accept-Language: en-us, zh-tw, zh-cn, fr, en, de-de MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Chuck Swiger References: <3F0316DE.3040301@tenebras.com> <20030702183838.GB4179@pit.databus.com> <3F0327FE.3030609@tenebras.com> <3F0331EE.6020707@mac.com> <3F0350C7.7010009@tenebras.com> <3F036571.8030609@mac.com> In-Reply-To: <3F036571.8030609@mac.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit cc: freebsd-ipfw@freebsd.org cc: freebsd-net@freebsd.org Subject: Re: Performance improvement for NAT in IPFIREWALL X-BeenThere: freebsd-ipfw@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.1 Precedence: list List-Id: IPFW Technical Discussions List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 02 Jul 2003 23:42:48 -0000 Chuck Swiger wrote: > To the extent that "security" is a matter of opinion, I guess that's all > right: I'm not concerned if other people have different opinions than I do. Security is an ill-defined concept. I prefer to think in terms of mitigating risk. In any case, deny_incoming offers some extra measure of security. > By itself, NAT provides no benefit to security, and some implementations > actually reduce the security of the system compared with not running > NAT. Sure, some implementations do. natd(8) was the first NAT daemon AFAIK to correctly handle the problem of rewriting the included IP header in ICMP error messages from nat'd hosts. > Let me pull out a couple of quotes from various people: You were better off when invoking "science" -- now you're invoking the mob ;-) > "Since NAT actually adds no security, You're of the school that sez "what I tell you three times is true?"