From owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Thu Apr 22 05:11:57 2004 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.FreeBSD.org (mx1.freebsd.org [216.136.204.125]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8E7F616A4CE for ; Thu, 22 Apr 2004 05:11:57 -0700 (PDT) Received: from gw.celabo.org (gw.celabo.org [208.42.49.153]) by mx1.FreeBSD.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 528F443D58 for ; Thu, 22 Apr 2004 05:11:57 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from nectar@celabo.org) Received: from madman.celabo.org (madman.celabo.org [10.0.1.111]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (Client CN "madman.celabo.org", Issuer "celabo.org CA" (not verified)) by gw.celabo.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DDC4E5485D; Thu, 22 Apr 2004 07:11:56 -0500 (CDT) Received: by madman.celabo.org (Postfix, from userid 1001) id 8D29A6D479; Thu, 22 Apr 2004 07:11:56 -0500 (CDT) Date: Thu, 22 Apr 2004 07:11:56 -0500 From: "Jacques A. Vidrine" To: Frankye - ML Message-ID: <20040422121156.GC29225@madman.celabo.org> Mail-Followup-To: "Jacques A. Vidrine" , Frankye - ML , freebsd-security@freebsd.org References: <200404210158.i3L1wxoM010197@caligula.anu.edu.au> <20040422135112.21abe234@godzilla> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20040422135112.21abe234@godzilla> X-Url: http://www.celabo.org/ User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.6i cc: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Subject: Re: Fw: [bugtraq] NetBSD Security Advisory 2004-006: TCP protocol and implementation vulnerability X-BeenThere: freebsd-security@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.1 Precedence: list List-Id: Security issues [members-only posting] List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 22 Apr 2004 12:11:57 -0000 On Thu, Apr 22, 2004 at 01:51:12PM +0200, Frankye - ML wrote: [...] > Additionally, the 4.4BSD stack from which NetBSD's stack is derived, did > not even check that a RST's sequence number was inside the window. RSTs > anywhere to the left of the window were treated as valid. > > The fact that this has gone unnoticed for so long is an indication that > there have not been a large number of RST/SYN DoS attacks ocurring in the > wild. Hmm, is this the same issue that we corrected in 1998? Certainly we became aware of it because it *was* being exploited. Cheers, -- Jacques Vidrine / nectar@celabo.org / jvidrine@verio.net / nectar@freebsd.org