From owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Thu Sep 18 18:36:37 2003 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.FreeBSD.org (mx1.freebsd.org [216.136.204.125]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2CCBA16A4B3 for ; Thu, 18 Sep 2003 18:36:37 -0700 (PDT) Received: from bas.flux.utah.edu (bas.flux.utah.edu [155.98.60.2]) by mx1.FreeBSD.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 78A1443FDD for ; Thu, 18 Sep 2003 18:36:36 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from danderse@flux.utah.edu) Received: from bas.flux.utah.edu (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by bas.flux.utah.edu (8.12.5/8.12.5) with ESMTP id h8J1aaR0023080; Thu, 18 Sep 2003 19:36:36 -0600 (MDT) (envelope-from danderse@bas.flux.utah.edu) Received: (from danderse@localhost) by bas.flux.utah.edu (8.12.5/8.12.5/Submit) id h8J1aaWF023079; Thu, 18 Sep 2003 19:36:36 -0600 (MDT) Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2003 19:36:36 -0600 From: "David G. Andersen" To: "Devon H. O'Dell" Message-ID: <20030918193636.A94860@cs.utah.edu> References: <3F6A5BBF.3020102@sitetronics.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline User-Agent: Mutt/1.2.5.1i In-Reply-To: <3F6A5BBF.3020102@sitetronics.com>; from dodell@sitetronics.com on Fri, Sep 19, 2003 at 03:28:31AM +0200 cc: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Subject: Re: [Fwd: Re: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-03:12.openssh] X-BeenThere: freebsd-security@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.1 Precedence: list List-Id: Security issues [members-only posting] List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 19 Sep 2003 01:36:37 -0000 Devon H. O'Dell just mooed: > > If I'm not mistaken, /dev/random is a pseudo-random generator, which > means it has a certain period before it begins to repeat numbers (along > with that it just isn't truly random). So, please correct me if I'm > wrong, but doesn't this mean that when reading from /dev/random, you're > 'losing' randomness/entropy/whatever you're calling it? You're mistaken. /dev/random stops feeding you random bits when it doesn't have enough. /dev/urandom depletes the entropy pool, but when it starts to run out, it falls back to hashing to generate pseudo-random sequences from the random bits that it can obtain. -Dave -- work: dga@lcs.mit.edu me: dga@pobox.com MIT Laboratory for Computer Science http://www.angio.net/ I do not accept unsolicited commercial email. Do not spam me.