From owner-freebsd-current Wed Nov 24 7:24:32 1999 Delivered-To: freebsd-current@freebsd.org Received: from khavrinen.lcs.mit.edu (khavrinen.lcs.mit.edu [18.24.4.193]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AF47F15242 for ; Wed, 24 Nov 1999 07:24:19 -0800 (PST) (envelope-from wollman@khavrinen.lcs.mit.edu) Received: (from wollman@localhost) by khavrinen.lcs.mit.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) id KAA29780; Wed, 24 Nov 1999 10:23:54 -0500 (EST) (envelope-from wollman) Date: Wed, 24 Nov 1999 10:23:54 -0500 (EST) From: Garrett Wollman Message-Id: <199911241523.KAA29780@khavrinen.lcs.mit.edu> To: Mike Smith Cc: freebsd-current@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: ps on 4.0-current In-Reply-To: <199911240546.VAA00843@dingo.cdrom.com> References: <19991123183733.A21142@dan.emsphone.com> <199911240546.VAA00843@dingo.cdrom.com> Sender: owner-freebsd-current@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk X-Loop: FreeBSD.ORG < said: > This was discussed close to death before the changes were committed, Where, and by whom? I don't recall seeing any such discussion on -security. > and the current behaviour (restricted access) has been agreed by > general consensus to be the most appropriate. Agreed by whom? Remember POLA? > Making this behaviour tunable would be bad; it adds another option Indeed; it should be reverted completely. Portable programs may not rely on their argv[] being ``secret''. Portable sysadmins rely on argv[] not being ``secret''. Having bogus behavior such as this encourages sysadmins to do all their work as root -- a very Bad Thing. Not only that, it violates 20 years of UNIX tradition. -GAWollman -- Garrett A. Wollman | O Siem / We are all family / O Siem / We're all the same wollman@lcs.mit.edu | O Siem / The fires of freedom Opinions not those of| Dance in the burning flame MIT, LCS, CRS, or NSA| - Susan Aglukark and Chad Irschick To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-current" in the body of the message