From owner-freebsd-security Mon Jul 24 14: 0: 7 2000 Delivered-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Received: from silby.com (cb34181-a.mdsn1.wi.home.com [24.14.173.39]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with SMTP id 960B437BCEA for ; Mon, 24 Jul 2000 14:00:00 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from silby@silby.com) Received: (qmail 5748 invoked by uid 1000); 24 Jul 2000 20:59:59 -0000 Received: from localhost (sendmail-bs@127.0.0.1) by localhost with SMTP; 24 Jul 2000 20:59:59 -0000 Date: Mon, 24 Jul 2000 15:59:59 -0500 (CDT) From: Mike Silbersack To: Adrian Chadd Cc: Terje Elde , Robert Watson , Sheldon Hearn , =?iso-8859-1?Q?Joachim_Str=F6mbergson?= , Greg Lewis , freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: Status of FreeBSD security work? Audit, regression and crypto swap? In-Reply-To: <20000724210042.O62551@ywing.creative.net.au> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Sender: owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk X-Loop: FreeBSD.org On Mon, 24 Jul 2000, Adrian Chadd wrote: > Whats wrong with a bdev io layer like vinum/ccd which does crypto? > Then you could swap and filesystem to your block devices to your hearts > content with whatever filesystem you wanted? Encrypting at that low of a level wouldn't be very useful in the long run. For an encrypted filesystem to be truly useful, each user's files are encrypted with their own key. A partition-wide encryption doesn't protect anything if you get root hacked on your box. And a crypto swap should use as many keys as possible (see the openbsd implementation paper.) Mike "Silby" Silbersack To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message