From owner-cvs-all Wed Dec 2 13:55:50 1998 Return-Path: Received: (from majordom@localhost) by hub.freebsd.org (8.8.8/8.8.8) id NAA09588 for cvs-all-outgoing; Wed, 2 Dec 1998 13:55:50 -0800 (PST) (envelope-from owner-cvs-all@FreeBSD.ORG) Received: from apollo.backplane.com (apollo.backplane.com [209.157.86.2]) by hub.freebsd.org (8.8.8/8.8.8) with ESMTP id NAA09578; Wed, 2 Dec 1998 13:55:48 -0800 (PST) (envelope-from dillon@apollo.backplane.com) Received: (from dillon@localhost) by apollo.backplane.com (8.9.1/8.9.1) id NAA19166; Wed, 2 Dec 1998 13:55:34 -0800 (PST) (envelope-from dillon) Date: Wed, 2 Dec 1998 13:55:34 -0800 (PST) From: Matthew Dillon Message-Id: <199812022155.NAA19166@apollo.backplane.com> To: dima@best.net (Dima Ruban) Cc: ache@nagual.pp.ru (Andrey A. Chernov), guido@gvr.org, cvs-committers@FreeBSD.ORG, cvs-all@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: cvs commit: src/etc master.passwd References: <199812022135.NAA02023@burka.rdy.com> Sender: owner-cvs-all@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk I use the operator account for backups too (via ssh/dump). But, that said, since master.passwd is only installed on totally clean, new systems, I don't think the defaults make much of a difference. Besides, the password is '*'d out. I suppose, theoretically, if some hacker were able to create a file or directories in /, they would be able to break into the account. But anyone capable of that can probably break root directly. If we were totally paranoid, we would set these home directories to a secure subdirectory using chflags [no]schg. I'm not that paranoid. -Matt :I think, it's bullshit change. I use operator account to do backups for :example. Now, this commit breaks half of my scripts. And I don't think I'm :... :-- dima Matthew Dillon Engineering, HiWay Technologies, Inc. & BEST Internet Communications & God knows what else. (Please include original email in any response) To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe cvs-all" in the body of the message