From owner-freebsd-security Mon Jul 24 23: 6:57 2000 Delivered-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Received: from ywing.creative.net.au (ywing.creative.net.au [203.56.168.34]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A5B4D37B989; Mon, 24 Jul 2000 23:06:47 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from adrian@ywing.creative.net.au) Received: (from adrian@localhost) by ywing.creative.net.au (8.9.3/8.9.3) id IAA65973; Tue, 25 Jul 2000 08:14:24 +0200 (CEST) (envelope-from adrian) Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2000 08:14:23 +0200 From: Adrian Chadd To: Mike Silbersack Cc: Kris Kennaway , Adrian Chadd , Terje Elde , Robert Watson , Sheldon Hearn , =?iso-8859-1?Q?Joachim_Str=F6mbergson?= , Greg Lewis , freebsd-security@FreeBSD.org Subject: Re: Status of FreeBSD security work? Audit, regression and crypto swap? Message-ID: <20000725081423.Q62551@ywing.creative.net.au> References: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline User-Agent: Mutt/1.2i In-Reply-To: ; from silby@silby.com on Mon, Jul 24, 2000 at 07:40:09PM -0500 Sender: owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk X-Loop: FreeBSD.org On Mon, Jul 24, 2000, Mike Silbersack wrote: > > On Mon, 24 Jul 2000, Kris Kennaway wrote: > > > On Mon, 24 Jul 2000, Mike Silbersack wrote: > > > > > Encrypting at that low of a level wouldn't be very useful in the long > > > run. For an encrypted filesystem to be truly useful, each user's files > > > are encrypted with their own key. A partition-wide encryption doesn't > > > protect anything if you get root hacked on your box. > > > > Except this breaks the Unix filesystem semantic that you can read other > > people's files (if they have to provide their key manually and it is not > > pre-available), which is probably necessary for system operation. Unless > > all of the keys were available in the kernel without user intervention and > > stored persistently (perhaps encrypted by a master key), which sort of > > defeats the purpose unless you have somewhere "better" to store the key > > table than on disk. > > > > Kris > > Sorry, I should've mentioned that the encryption would be on a per-file > basis. For example, I'd encrypt ~silby/personal and leave everything else > untouched. This is how TCFS/CFS works, if I understand correctly. Ok. Someone is going to have to make stacking layers finally work. ;-) Adrian -- Adrian Chadd Now 17-year-olds can't play a _video game_ because its called violent - and real violence is still called dinner. -- jamie@mccarthy.org To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message