From owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Thu Jun 5 15:18:41 2014 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [8.8.178.115]) (using TLSv1 with cipher ADH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 23065D9D for ; Thu, 5 Jun 2014 15:18:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: from smtp2.ppse.net (smtp2.ppse.net [217.195.113.12]) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A417528BA for ; Thu, 5 Jun 2014 15:18:40 +0000 (UTC) Received: from Jappes-MacBook-Pro.local (office.vellance.net [95.97.142.106]) by smtp2.ppse.net (Postfix) with ESMTPA id F28E93F404 for ; Thu, 5 Jun 2014 17:09:57 +0200 (CEST) Message-ID: <53908845.20900@lowlife.org> Date: Thu, 05 Jun 2014 17:09:57 +0200 From: Jappe Reuling User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.9; rv:24.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/24.5.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Subject: Re: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-14:14.openssl References: <201406051316.s55DGtGw041955@freefall.freebsd.org> In-Reply-To: <201406051316.s55DGtGw041955@freefall.freebsd.org> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-BeenThere: freebsd-security@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.18 Precedence: list List-Id: "Security issues \[members-only posting\]" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 05 Jun 2014 15:18:41 -0000 Hi, One, my appologies if it's a stupid one, question: the advisory is for DTLS, hence UDP TLS, right? Normally you would run SSL (TLS a.o.) via TCP. So what would use DTLS (in the base system) and could be vulnerable? A mailserver using TLS and linked to the base system's openssl would be using TCP...? Thanks in advance. Jappe On 05/06/14 15:16, FreeBSD Security Advisories wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA512 > > ============================================================================= > FreeBSD-SA-14:14.openssl Security Advisory > The FreeBSD Project > > Topic: OpenSSL multiple vulnerabilities > > Category: contrib > Module: openssl > Announced: 2014-06-05 > Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD. > Corrected: 2014-06-05 12:32:38 UTC (stable/10, 10.0-STABLE) > 2014-06-05 12:33:23 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RELEASE-p5) > 2014-06-05 12:53:06 UTC (stable/9, 9.3-BETA1) > 2014-06-05 12:53:06 UTC (stable/9, 9.3-BETA1-p2) > 2014-06-05 12:33:23 UTC (releng/9.2, 9.2-RELEASE-p8) > 2014-06-05 12:33:23 UTC (releng/9.1, 9.1-RELEASE-p15) > 2014-06-05 12:32:38 UTC (stable/8, 8.4-STABLE) > 2014-06-05 12:33:23 UTC (releng/8.4, 8.4-RELEASE-p12) > CVE Name: CVE-2014-0195, CVE-2014-0221, CVE-2014-0224, CVE-2014-3470 > > For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, > including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the > following sections, please visit . > > I. Background > > FreeBSD includes software from the OpenSSL Project. The OpenSSL Project is > a collaborative effort to develop a robust, commercial-grade, full-featured > Open Source toolkit implementing the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) > and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1) protocols as well as a full-strength > general purpose cryptography library. > > II. Problem Description > > Receipt of an invalid DTLS fragment on an OpenSSL DTLS client or server can > lead to a buffer overrun. [CVE-2014-0195] > > Receipt of an invalid DTLS handshake on an OpenSSL DTLS client can lead the > code to unnecessary recurse. [CVE-2014-0221] > > Carefully crafted handshake can force the use of weak keying material in > OpenSSL SSL/TLS clients and servers. [CVE-2014-0224] > > Carefully crafted packets can lead to a NULL pointer deference in OpenSSL > TLS client code if anonymous ECDH ciphersuites are enabled. [CVE-2014-3470] > > III. Impact > > A remote attacker may be able to run arbitrary code on a vulnerable client > or server by sending invalid DTLS fragments to an OpenSSL DTLS client or > server. [CVE-2014-0195] > > A remote attacker who can send an invalid DTLS handshake to an OpenSSL DTLS > client can crash the remote OpenSSL DTLS client. [CVE-2014-0221] > > A remote attacker who can send a carefully crafted handshake can force the > use of weak keying material between a vulnerable client and a vulnerable > server and decrypt and/or modify traffic from the attacked client and > server in a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. [CVE-2014-0224] > > A remote attacker who can send carefully crafted packets can cause OpenSSL > TLS client to crash. [CVE-2014-3470] > > IV. Workaround > > No workaround is available. > > V. Solution > > Perform one of the following: > > 1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or > release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date. > > 2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch: > > The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable > FreeBSD release branches. > > a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the > detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. > > [FreeBSD 10.0] > # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:14/openssl-10.patch > # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:14/openssl-10.patch.asc > # gpg --verify openssl-10.patch.asc > > [FreeBSD 9.x and 8.x] > # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:14/openssl-9.patch > # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:14/openssl-9.patch.asc > # gpg --verify openssl-9.patch.asc > > b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root: > > # cd /usr/src > # patch < /path/to/patch > > c) Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as > described in . > > Restart all deamons using the library, or reboot the system. > > 3) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch: > > Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64 > platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility: > > # freebsd-update fetch > # freebsd-update install > > VI. Correction details > > The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each > affected branch. > > Branch/path Revision > - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- > stable/8/ r267103 > releng/8.4/ r267104 > stable/9/ r267106 > releng/9.1/ r267104 > releng/9.2/ r267104 > stable/10/ r267103 > releng/10.0/ r267104 > - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the > following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a > machine with Subversion installed: > > # svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base > > Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number: > > > > VII. References > > > > > > > > > > > > The latest revision of this advisory is available at > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (FreeBSD) > > iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJTkGuTAAoJEO1n7NZdz2rnomEP/AzIur2b4KXcOJnPSq+Fgz2E > ThZnGpYaWGQXkBnPcARtLUN+98UQkdcVOpDXExdTP/mz+fRH5P14qBCwgFXfMX1a > Ins6M696pAyBE+SHjFMwX/pSA402Y2LFcfUgq1f9oBKPM77+X/9J4z4NPXB72qTp > ULLTBVtHiqwlcO6bD+YlpE5AfvoKoUI0MmmkuA4R1zmY/JBgDqN68oiTn7KwRp5m > v44uVuGF+gGMMkN5oZmXqn89+CbRjDkyk9gvHhe1VXZLfZi6GDlayNMpuBdj9laU > 3jpMMqwXGF45j524Ai03U/lAzO7Fn1Zl87dlElPk1BMaVmG8uGFipiULPQqsyUC9 > rchzXxtDM7VVA/p7G3Vn6RHbOPeNCxhuFonq1WxVBrXImIw23PRWDlYx+Kve5trH > gJvztI6CkD0f6NOf7HM7LYU1slvGFykFhoGeurxFVfKT2YlulL6HcRx4QPFE33c1 > W57wPHUvZ2w8hO0OU1zX1pz1qE6je+DoSTq7bob5ExXmDWCu2LElmKXW67N2tGYq > kNetRkTR9qwDlmexrcyAVgR45a/9oe/p9taTgm2/8ITzaHjexYcGn/tL7Mc9pYCa > Dj9FP0D52foKj3PjVfSZc/8kgJklKhtugDvbK74MmruA6vUELRrY84O2kfpgAzLj > KfE2eBuieG9+Pdpk011t > =/CUF > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > _______________________________________________ > freebsd-security-notifications@freebsd.org mailing list > http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-security-notifications > To unsubscribe, send any mail to "freebsd-security-notifications-unsubscribe@freebsd.org" >