From owner-svn-src-stable-10@freebsd.org Fri May 13 08:25:07 2016 Return-Path: Delivered-To: svn-src-stable-10@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206a::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6EB07B39691; Fri, 13 May 2016 08:25:07 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from ngie@FreeBSD.org) Received: from repo.freebsd.org (repo.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:6068::e6a:0]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4AE4A1966; Fri, 13 May 2016 08:25:07 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from ngie@FreeBSD.org) Received: from repo.freebsd.org ([127.0.1.37]) by repo.freebsd.org (8.15.2/8.15.2) with ESMTP id u4D8P66c061943; Fri, 13 May 2016 08:25:06 GMT (envelope-from ngie@FreeBSD.org) Received: (from ngie@localhost) by repo.freebsd.org (8.15.2/8.15.2/Submit) id u4D8P6gr061940; Fri, 13 May 2016 08:25:06 GMT (envelope-from ngie@FreeBSD.org) Message-Id: <201605130825.u4D8P6gr061940@repo.freebsd.org> X-Authentication-Warning: repo.freebsd.org: ngie set sender to ngie@FreeBSD.org using -f From: Garrett Cooper Date: Fri, 13 May 2016 08:25:06 +0000 (UTC) To: src-committers@freebsd.org, svn-src-all@freebsd.org, svn-src-stable@freebsd.org, svn-src-stable-10@freebsd.org Subject: svn commit: r299617 - in stable/10/sys/kgssapi: . krb5 X-SVN-Group: stable-10 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-BeenThere: svn-src-stable-10@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22 Precedence: list List-Id: SVN commit messages for only the 10-stable src tree List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 13 May 2016 08:25:07 -0000 Author: ngie Date: Fri May 13 08:25:06 2016 New Revision: 299617 URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/base/299617 Log: MFC r295134,r298338,r298655: r295134 (by cem): kcrypto_aes: Use separate sessions for AES and SHA1 Some hardware supports AES acceleration but not SHA1, e.g., AES-NI extensions. It is useful to have accelerated AES even if SHA1 must be software. Suggested by: asomers r298338 (by cem): kgssapi(4): Don't allow user-provided arguments to overrun stack buffer An over-long path argument to gssd_syscall could overrun the stack sockaddr_un buffer. Fix gssd_syscall to not permit that. If an over-long path is provided, gssd_syscall now returns EINVAL. It looks like PRIV_NFS_DAEMON isn't granted anywhere, so my best guess is that this is likely only triggerable by root. CID: 1006751 r298655 (by cem): kgssapi: Don't leak memory in error cases CIDs: 1007046, 1007047, 1007048 Modified: stable/10/sys/kgssapi/gss_impl.c stable/10/sys/kgssapi/gssd_prot.c stable/10/sys/kgssapi/krb5/kcrypto_aes.c Directory Properties: stable/10/ (props changed) Modified: stable/10/sys/kgssapi/gss_impl.c ============================================================================== --- stable/10/sys/kgssapi/gss_impl.c Fri May 13 08:17:42 2016 (r299616) +++ stable/10/sys/kgssapi/gss_impl.c Fri May 13 08:25:06 2016 (r299617) @@ -104,10 +104,12 @@ sys_gssd_syscall(struct thread *td, stru error = copyinstr(uap->path, path, sizeof(path), NULL); if (error) return (error); + if (strlen(path) + 1 > sizeof(sun.sun_path)) + return (EINVAL); if (path[0] != '\0') { sun.sun_family = AF_LOCAL; - strcpy(sun.sun_path, path); + strlcpy(sun.sun_path, path, sizeof(sun.sun_path)); sun.sun_len = SUN_LEN(&sun); nconf = getnetconfigent("local"); Modified: stable/10/sys/kgssapi/gssd_prot.c ============================================================================== --- stable/10/sys/kgssapi/gssd_prot.c Fri May 13 08:17:42 2016 (r299616) +++ stable/10/sys/kgssapi/gssd_prot.c Fri May 13 08:25:06 2016 (r299617) @@ -101,8 +101,10 @@ xdr_gss_OID(XDR *xdrs, gss_OID *oidp) } else { oid = mem_alloc(sizeof(gss_OID_desc)); memset(oid, 0, sizeof(*oid)); - if (!xdr_gss_OID_desc(xdrs, oid)) + if (!xdr_gss_OID_desc(xdrs, oid)) { + mem_free(oid, sizeof(gss_OID_desc)); return (FALSE); + } *oidp = oid; } break; @@ -164,8 +166,10 @@ xdr_gss_OID_set(XDR *xdrs, gss_OID_set * } else { set = mem_alloc(sizeof(gss_OID_set_desc)); memset(set, 0, sizeof(*set)); - if (!xdr_gss_OID_set_desc(xdrs, set)) + if (!xdr_gss_OID_set_desc(xdrs, set)) { + mem_free(set, sizeof(gss_OID_set_desc)); return (FALSE); + } *setp = set; } break; @@ -224,8 +228,10 @@ xdr_gss_channel_bindings_t(XDR *xdrs, gs || !xdr_gss_buffer_desc(xdrs, &ch->acceptor_address) || !xdr_gss_buffer_desc(xdrs, - &ch->application_data)) + &ch->application_data)) { + mem_free(ch, sizeof(*ch)); return (FALSE); + } *chp = ch; } break; Modified: stable/10/sys/kgssapi/krb5/kcrypto_aes.c ============================================================================== --- stable/10/sys/kgssapi/krb5/kcrypto_aes.c Fri May 13 08:17:42 2016 (r299616) +++ stable/10/sys/kgssapi/krb5/kcrypto_aes.c Fri May 13 08:25:06 2016 (r299617) @@ -43,7 +43,8 @@ __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); struct aes_state { struct mtx as_lock; - uint64_t as_session; + uint64_t as_session_aes; + uint64_t as_session_sha1; }; static void @@ -61,8 +62,10 @@ aes_destroy(struct krb5_key_state *ks) { struct aes_state *as = ks->ks_priv; - if (as->as_session) - crypto_freesession(as->as_session); + if (as->as_session_aes != 0) + crypto_freesession(as->as_session_aes); + if (as->as_session_sha1 != 0) + crypto_freesession(as->as_session_sha1); mtx_destroy(&as->as_lock); free(ks->ks_priv, M_GSSAPI); } @@ -72,32 +75,35 @@ aes_set_key(struct krb5_key_state *ks, c { void *kp = ks->ks_key; struct aes_state *as = ks->ks_priv; - struct cryptoini cri[2]; + struct cryptoini cri; if (kp != in) bcopy(in, kp, ks->ks_class->ec_keylen); - if (as->as_session) - crypto_freesession(as->as_session); - - bzero(cri, sizeof(cri)); + if (as->as_session_aes != 0) + crypto_freesession(as->as_session_aes); + if (as->as_session_sha1 != 0) + crypto_freesession(as->as_session_sha1); /* * We only want the first 96 bits of the HMAC. */ - cri[0].cri_alg = CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC; - cri[0].cri_klen = ks->ks_class->ec_keybits; - cri[0].cri_mlen = 12; - cri[0].cri_key = ks->ks_key; - cri[0].cri_next = &cri[1]; - - cri[1].cri_alg = CRYPTO_AES_CBC; - cri[1].cri_klen = ks->ks_class->ec_keybits; - cri[1].cri_mlen = 0; - cri[1].cri_key = ks->ks_key; - cri[1].cri_next = NULL; + bzero(&cri, sizeof(cri)); + cri.cri_alg = CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC; + cri.cri_klen = ks->ks_class->ec_keybits; + cri.cri_mlen = 12; + cri.cri_key = ks->ks_key; + cri.cri_next = NULL; + crypto_newsession(&as->as_session_sha1, &cri, + CRYPTOCAP_F_HARDWARE | CRYPTOCAP_F_SOFTWARE); - crypto_newsession(&as->as_session, cri, + bzero(&cri, sizeof(cri)); + cri.cri_alg = CRYPTO_AES_CBC; + cri.cri_klen = ks->ks_class->ec_keybits; + cri.cri_mlen = 0; + cri.cri_key = ks->ks_key; + cri.cri_next = NULL; + crypto_newsession(&as->as_session_aes, &cri, CRYPTOCAP_F_HARDWARE | CRYPTOCAP_F_SOFTWARE); } @@ -114,7 +120,7 @@ aes_crypto_cb(struct cryptop *crp) int error; struct aes_state *as = (struct aes_state *) crp->crp_opaque; - if (CRYPTO_SESID2CAPS(as->as_session) & CRYPTOCAP_F_SYNC) + if (CRYPTO_SESID2CAPS(crp->crp_sid) & CRYPTOCAP_F_SYNC) return (0); error = crp->crp_etype; @@ -151,7 +157,7 @@ aes_encrypt_1(const struct krb5_key_stat crd->crd_next = NULL; crd->crd_alg = CRYPTO_AES_CBC; - crp->crp_sid = as->as_session; + crp->crp_sid = as->as_session_aes; crp->crp_flags = buftype | CRYPTO_F_CBIFSYNC; crp->crp_buf = buf; crp->crp_opaque = (void *) as; @@ -159,7 +165,7 @@ aes_encrypt_1(const struct krb5_key_stat error = crypto_dispatch(crp); - if ((CRYPTO_SESID2CAPS(as->as_session) & CRYPTOCAP_F_SYNC) == 0) { + if ((CRYPTO_SESID2CAPS(as->as_session_aes) & CRYPTOCAP_F_SYNC) == 0) { mtx_lock(&as->as_lock); if (!error && !(crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_DONE)) error = msleep(crp, &as->as_lock, 0, "gssaes", 0); @@ -326,7 +332,7 @@ aes_checksum(const struct krb5_key_state crd->crd_next = NULL; crd->crd_alg = CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC; - crp->crp_sid = as->as_session; + crp->crp_sid = as->as_session_sha1; crp->crp_ilen = inlen; crp->crp_olen = 12; crp->crp_etype = 0; @@ -337,7 +343,7 @@ aes_checksum(const struct krb5_key_state error = crypto_dispatch(crp); - if ((CRYPTO_SESID2CAPS(as->as_session) & CRYPTOCAP_F_SYNC) == 0) { + if ((CRYPTO_SESID2CAPS(as->as_session_sha1) & CRYPTOCAP_F_SYNC) == 0) { mtx_lock(&as->as_lock); if (!error && !(crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_DONE)) error = msleep(crp, &as->as_lock, 0, "gssaes", 0);