From owner-freebsd-security-notifications@freebsd.org Tue Dec 6 19:17:26 2016 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-security-notifications@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206a::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 29C37C6A3EC for ; Tue, 6 Dec 2016 19:17:26 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from security-advisories@freebsd.org) Received: from freefall.freebsd.org (freefall.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:6074::16:84]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (Client CN "freefall.freebsd.org", Issuer "Let's Encrypt Authority X3" (verified OK)) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0DF781C65; Tue, 6 Dec 2016 19:17:26 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from security-advisories@freebsd.org) Received: by freefall.freebsd.org (Postfix, from userid 1025) id 60A724B2; Tue, 6 Dec 2016 19:17:25 +0000 (UTC) From: FreeBSD Security Advisories To: FreeBSD Security Advisories Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-16:36.telnetd Reply-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Precedence: bulk Message-Id: <20161206191725.60A724B2@freefall.freebsd.org> Date: Tue, 6 Dec 2016 19:17:25 +0000 (UTC) X-BeenThere: freebsd-security-notifications@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 List-Id: "Moderated Security Notifications \[moderated, low volume\]" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 06 Dec 2016 19:17:26 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-16:36.telnetd Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: Possible login(1) argument injection in telnetd(8) Category: core Module: telnetd Announced: 2016-12-06 Credits: Brooks Davis (sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL) Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD. Corrected: 2016-12-06 18:52:02 UTC (stable/11, 11.0-STABLE) 2016-12-06 18:49:38 UTC (releng/11.0, 11.0-RELEASE-p4) 2016-12-06 18:52:18 UTC (stable/10, 10.3-STABLE) 2016-12-06 18:49:48 UTC (releng/10.3, 10.3-RELEASE-p13) 2016-12-06 18:49:54 UTC (releng/10.2, 10.2-RELEASE-p26) 2016-12-06 18:49:59 UTC (releng/10.1, 10.1-RELEASE-p43) 2016-12-06 18:52:33 UTC (stable/9, 9.3-STABLE) 2016-12-06 18:50:06 UTC (releng/9.3, 9.3-RELEASE-p51) CVE Name: CVE-2016-1888 For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the following sections, please visit . I. Background The FreeBSD telnet daemon, telnetd(8), implements the server side of the TELNET virtual terminal protocol. It has been disabled by default in FreeBSD since August 2001, and due to the lack of cryptographic security in the TELNET protocol, it is strongly recommended that the SSH protocol be used instead. The FreeBSD telnet daemon can be enabled via the /etc/inetd.conf configuration file and the inetd(8) daemon. After a user is connected, telnetd executes the login(1) program or a similar program specified by the -p argument. In order to do so, it constructs an array of command line arguments which are passed to execv(3). II. Problem Description An unexpected sequence of memory allocation failures combined with insufficient error checking could result in the construction and execution of an argument sequence that was not intended. III. Impact An attacker who controls the sequence of memory allocation failures and success may cause login(1) to run without authentication and may be able to cause misbehavior of login(1) replacements. No practical way of controlling these memory allocation failures is known at this time. IV. Workaround No workaround is available, but systems not running the telnet daemon are not vulnerable. Note that the telnet daemon is usually run via inetd, and consequently will not show up in a process listing unless a connection is currently active; to determine if it is enabled, run $ ps ax | grep telnetd | grep -v grep $ grep telnetd /etc/inetd.conf | grep -vE '^#' If any output is produced, your system may be vulnerable. V. Solution Perform one of the following: 1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date. 2) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch: Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64 platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility: # freebsd-update fetch # freebsd-update install 3) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch: The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable FreeBSD release branches. a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-16:36/telnetd.patch # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-16:36/telnetd.patch.asc # gpg --verify telnetd.patch.asc b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root: # cd /usr/src # patch < /path/to/patch c) Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as described in . Kill any running telnetd processes, or reboot the system. VI. Correction details The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each affected branch. Branch/path Revision - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- stable/9/ r309643 releng/9.3/ r309637 stable/10/ r309642 releng/10.1/ r309636 releng/10.2/ r309635 releng/10.3/ r309634 stable/11/ r309641 releng/11.0/ r309633 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a machine with Subversion installed: # svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number: VII. References The latest revision of this advisory is available at -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJYRw1uAAoJEO1n7NZdz2rnUC0P/3R7UoeNFknnYEXs25NnTS3h oDZnGEbLloqQC4mAtPsC2v9WdSRh318J7UMOpko+uYlvxwsJe9TXRgUwP24atdtJ a0Al8BvbmIHckIxG7cFJ6Xsw5NDXBgHo2JWBgdU2xvRafZYvFmjlGyxGrvg6Ok0s LCz+cnOwni+J4R0CUHTb7eyoeW4HYsg5bVBnzmDwdqQTiig4PsIBVSu+VbOM8kTT u7JCzxibzwm9TE0orxDBsY60//hbJRMm12SXj+tVJS3w+qK2iY+Aq02llyTqlGHd Tpz4++d9UlS5QSPnu42ev/wzfPDZoxhbb5yciEUDSZA7vG5RD0pCfxfOf+8zORXA PLp8XRrl76DJonULUjtNPo8xE3gFOztbUZyTFpxChXUPzZGp0oPRQgTIBTMEPejH jC7O5ic0q7aA8UcQk5tqn6lNS6eK6z2UoKGYN4qCjTlC18s1u9dPwHzeSAzjg5YF fHX0t/MB8zJ5ts0pUs6OTMOu6umrP4SUJF9hpACFG16vzjJ1S573tuPr9L4HMNCv XTX9kjcFwmHqpbrFYW38Fk90x14TT3tigi+xYvCruS1XQeLQM48ThgYAdEboGJvT 8LGVI8rbwjaglrEk670RlnWVKQInqtPBmbV/GXL9AtE4zzsTHXDT/7iJ30pb4RJq rA+cnK1Bog6FHCWGTxjF =uYUg -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From owner-freebsd-security-notifications@freebsd.org Tue Dec 6 19:17:37 2016 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-security-notifications@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206a::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 066DEC6A454 for ; Tue, 6 Dec 2016 19:17:37 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from security-advisories@freebsd.org) Received: from freefall.freebsd.org (freefall.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:6074::16:84]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (Client CN "freefall.freebsd.org", Issuer "Let's Encrypt Authority X3" (verified OK)) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DE0B31D1B; Tue, 6 Dec 2016 19:17:36 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from security-advisories@freebsd.org) Received: by freefall.freebsd.org (Postfix, from userid 1025) id 3C6D34E3; Tue, 6 Dec 2016 19:17:36 +0000 (UTC) From: FreeBSD Security Advisories To: FreeBSD Security Advisories Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-16:38.bhyve Reply-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Precedence: bulk Message-Id: <20161206191736.3C6D34E3@freefall.freebsd.org> Date: Tue, 6 Dec 2016 19:17:36 +0000 (UTC) X-BeenThere: freebsd-security-notifications@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 List-Id: "Moderated Security Notifications \[moderated, low volume\]" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 06 Dec 2016 19:17:37 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-16:38.bhyve Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: bhyve(8) virtual machine escape Category: core Module: bhyve Announced: 2016-12-06 Credits: Felix Wilhelm Affects: FreeBSD 10.x, FreeBSD 11.0 Corrected: 2016-12-06 18:54:43 UTC (stable/11, 11.0-STABLE) 2016-12-06 18:49:38 UTC (releng/11.0, 11.0-RELEASE-p4) 2016-12-06 18:55:01 UTC (stable/10, 10.3-STABLE) 2016-12-06 18:49:48 UTC (releng/10.3, 10.3-RELEASE-p13) 2016-12-06 18:49:54 UTC (releng/10.2, 10.2-RELEASE-p26) 2016-12-06 18:49:59 UTC (releng/10.1, 10.1-RELEASE-p43) CVE Name: CVE-2016-1889 For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the following sections, please visit . I. Background bhyve(8) is a hypervisor that supports running a variety of virtual machines (guests). II. Problem Description The bounds checking of accesses to guest memory greater than 4GB by device emulations is subject to integer overflow. III. Impact For a bhyve virtual machine with more than 3GB of guest memory configured, a malicious guest could craft device descriptors that could give it access to the heap of the bhyve process. Since the bhyve process is running as root, this may allow guests to obtain full control of the hosts they're running on. IV. Workaround No workaround is available, however, systems not using bhyve(8) for virtualization are not vulnerable. Additionally, systems using bhyve(8) with 3GB or less of configured guest memory are not vulnerable. V. Solution Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date. No reboot is needed. Rather the bhyve(8) process for vulnerable virtual machines should be restarted. Perform one of the following: 1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date. 2) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch: Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the amd64 platform can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility: # freebsd-update fetch # freebsd-update install 3) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch: The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable FreeBSD release branches. a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. [FreeBSD 11.0, FreeBSD 10.3] # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-16:38/bhyve.patch # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-16:38/bhyve.patch.asc # gpg --verify bhyve.patch.asc [FreeBSD 10.2, FreeBSD 10.1] # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-16:38/bhyve-10.patch # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-16:38/bhyve-10.patch.asc # gpg --verify bhyve-10.patch.asc b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root: # cd /usr/src # patch < /path/to/patch Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as described in . VI. Correction details The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each affected branch. Branch/path Revision - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- stable/10/ r309648 releng/10.1/ r309636 releng/10.2/ r309635 releng/10.3/ r309634 stable/11/ r309647 releng/11.0/ r309633 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a machine with Subversion installed: # svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number: VII. References The latest revision of this advisory is available at -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJYRw1wAAoJEO1n7NZdz2rnepoP/1b6uXh8BFW8Qi9cVyfUkldC aRfAdmE3azyJCwTY2cipIA+qp9SJUxnLf1lPicERIPZY6iiC6Zm1Qi+cfwCvgczu ksY9aYOM7/v1jKuUrPf7tJZ5OokRzkL8W2uCKqAn2BODBK1mA4yy8yGthgyCT6bH JzvINPnlQzJKHCdp/8goRVITxa+kMF7UBbpPDAkHuBNKKNRLOYb50Z9G7BZp9/u6 /Y8avPVCOnU7WKDehG6FgyfE0Z+pUw6dAgpYNblsdQc148xGCSoHyHjXIX1jHzCv ZChUhj+6m7CQkjh/GG6x1Bz1lCcsIgsnPAAuQC0WqsaQRnUWJXjTyPMHwkxIHlD7 sFGPdM4RdMI0O95xMm9Dy05baNsAtBr6DExd48jFv/qbUio9FhUNUJ5rfQEAnyp2 aAZL34rd90KPFn5zp8EhskOPWGJp7lr+5FpV1m85R07qRES9875eWWYUW5H+yZK+ kwUcRKiYyvAFTx7Ag38pCtH4SVZ4zRV0mBZnOvchNosMSJz+tZYxApaXHY/nBJck wCr+v4DlB9x4LKt9CnB1ow+YqVsMuPyXwyj4e9Pyw/zkvW1aA/TJeUonmm1c2vI4 07b64wnTsvLGgbhN2ei8LPtAEwpN/DBn7D098Zwf4CfCGQ2VZQeC5AjyTSX9bvy/ WnKlRTDLDrFSpAD/1/Dz =ts3q -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From owner-freebsd-security-notifications@freebsd.org Tue Dec 6 19:17:32 2016 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-security-notifications@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206a::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6EB5AC6A449 for ; Tue, 6 Dec 2016 19:17:32 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from security-advisories@freebsd.org) Received: from freefall.freebsd.org (freefall.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:6074::16:84]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (Client CN "freefall.freebsd.org", Issuer "Let's Encrypt Authority X3" (verified OK)) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 51AE91CB5; Tue, 6 Dec 2016 19:17:32 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from security-advisories@freebsd.org) Received: by freefall.freebsd.org (Postfix, from userid 1025) id E92FE4C3; Tue, 6 Dec 2016 19:17:30 +0000 (UTC) From: FreeBSD Security Advisories To: FreeBSD Security Advisories Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-16:37.libc Reply-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Precedence: bulk Message-Id: <20161206191730.E92FE4C3@freefall.freebsd.org> Date: Tue, 6 Dec 2016 19:17:30 +0000 (UTC) X-BeenThere: freebsd-security-notifications@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 List-Id: "Moderated Security Notifications \[moderated, low volume\]" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 06 Dec 2016 19:17:32 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-16:37.libc Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: link_ntoa(3) buffer overflow Category: core Module: libc Announced: 2016-12-06 Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD. Corrected: 2016-12-06 18:53:21 UTC (stable/11, 11.0-STABLE) 2016-12-06 18:49:38 UTC (releng/11.0, 11.0-RELEASE-p4) 2016-12-06 18:53:46 UTC (stable/10, 10.3-STABLE) 2016-12-06 18:49:48 UTC (releng/10.3, 10.3-RELEASE-p13) 2016-12-06 18:49:54 UTC (releng/10.2, 10.2-RELEASE-p26) 2016-12-06 18:49:59 UTC (releng/10.1, 10.1-RELEASE-p43) 2016-12-06 18:54:04 UTC (stable/9, 9.3-STABLE) 2016-12-06 18:50:06 UTC (releng/9.3, 9.3-RELEASE-p51) CVE Name: CVE-2016-6559 For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the following sections, please visit . I. Background The link_ntoa(3) function generates ASCII representation of a link-level address and is avaliable as part of standard C library (libc). II. Problem Description A specially crafted argument can trigger a static buffer overflow in the library, with possibility to rewrite following static buffers that belong to other library functions. III. Impact Due to very limited use of the function in the existing applications, and limited length of the overflow, exploitation of the vulnerability does not seem feasible. None of the utilities and daemons in the base system are known to be vulnerable. However, careful review of third party software that may use the function was not performed. IV. Workaround No workaround is available. V. Solution Perform one of the following: 1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date. 2) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch: Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64 platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility: # freebsd-update fetch # freebsd-update install Restart all daemons that use the library, or reboot the system. 3) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch: The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable FreeBSD release branches. a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-16:37/libc.patch # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-16:37/libc.patch.asc # gpg --verify libc.patch.asc b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root: # cd /usr/src # patch < /path/to/patch c) Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as described in . Restart all daemons that use the library, or reboot the system. VI. Correction details The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each affected branch. Branch/path Revision - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- stable/9/ r309646 releng/9.3/ r309637 stable/10/ r309645 releng/10.1/ r309636 releng/10.2/ r309635 releng/10.3/ r309634 stable/11/ r309644 releng/11.0/ r309633 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a machine with Subversion installed: # svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number: VII. References The latest revision of this advisory is available at -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJYRw1vAAoJEO1n7NZdz2rnk5sP/18NuTRoit3jfa1uHCYMyTOB vOGtNtn5xs8NNY4wAdYx2cF3CscTZEWyQtXWsMWzXgbWI0KrWteacGDaDlFwraCu 9/TJmkCQC5FCfYsgQFOpOPtMl9W+gY2ZrmEPXsfc/smjvIas3fPCBjnoRM2qQlfc 25YIut+S6OFhm2XM42t/jljbLs6b/PJikeKt7kEEEjKKXWHNwLEYjbtEyelKxD1i 1IBVe4Run2RajERg99yCznAGGvRo2hbGmnV59kDAilanJK+s3pzCOBFdnKyZd/2l Ie8B/fKEXRJyFgJF7A9eSuElTV5fCFfX05AC3PXMoi+GsVPQqhEpNb1FvJoANiFL l61nbqkM5KEteIWvf1udHZo6kjhYY4YlvutXW7o41XaUhnaO3dC+4+VpfTycH/no j8kVFS1Y9oun31TTZ/+aQqnCfozAMKFaZtrZI3UkSR1kjz5Z5Rqrc4isBhXXP1dQ QC87THCyW2D1+E0LvMyJEWKtjGMd8OO5KZjvTxcmxDSrqEOn+yGT1Lp8G/NLuQ4D zcarPPl2eE0bikvL/T/k7OdpplTDXoaCOHiMIr02WpbJwipw6HD4FZrg1IQu/Db9 2cHihr/tS1mbr7k/VKUyIZvQQhZ9j72m4wwBk0CFEG8DeZtMeSum1xgLTEjUerHe rWrKG2feWv//R0BvVNhu =8y53 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From owner-freebsd-security-notifications@freebsd.org Thu Dec 8 04:00:03 2016 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-security-notifications@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206a::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1EFAAC6C82B for ; Thu, 8 Dec 2016 04:00:03 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from security-advisories@freebsd.org) Received: from freefall.freebsd.org (freefall.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:6074::16:84]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (Client CN "freefall.freebsd.org", Issuer "Let's Encrypt Authority X3" (verified OK)) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 031AD86; Thu, 8 Dec 2016 04:00:03 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from security-advisories@freebsd.org) Received: by freefall.freebsd.org (Postfix, from userid 1025) id 39F4F16BB; Thu, 8 Dec 2016 04:00:02 +0000 (UTC) From: FreeBSD Security Advisories To: FreeBSD Security Advisories Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-16:37.libc [REVISED] Reply-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Precedence: bulk Message-Id: <20161208040002.39F4F16BB@freefall.freebsd.org> Date: Thu, 8 Dec 2016 04:00:02 +0000 (UTC) X-BeenThere: freebsd-security-notifications@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 List-Id: "Moderated Security Notifications \[moderated, low volume\]" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 08 Dec 2016 04:00:03 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-16:37.libc Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: link_ntoa(3) buffer overflow Category: core Module: libc Announced: 2016-12-06, revised on 2016-12-08 Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD. Corrected: 2016-12-07 23:19:46 UTC (stable/11, 11.0-STABLE) 2016-12-07 23:29:42 UTC (releng/11.0, 11.0-RELEASE-p5) 2016-12-07 23:20:26 UTC (stable/10, 10.3-STABLE) 2016-12-07 23:31:07 UTC (releng/10.3, 10.3-RELEASE-p14) 2016-12-07 23:32:42 UTC (releng/10.2, 10.2-RELEASE-p27) 2016-12-07 23:34:06 UTC (releng/10.1, 10.1-RELEASE-p44) 2016-12-07 23:20:50 UTC (stable/9, 9.3-STABLE) 2016-12-07 23:35:15 UTC (releng/9.3, 9.3-RELEASE-p52) CVE Name: CVE-2016-6559 For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the following sections, please visit . 0. Revision history. v1.0 2016-12-06 Initial release. v1.1 2016-12-08 Revised patches to address regressions. I. Background The link_ntoa(3) function generates ASCII representation of a link-level address and is avaliable as part of standard C library (libc). II. Problem Description A specially crafted argument can trigger a static buffer overflow in the library, with possibility to rewrite following static buffers that belong to other library functions. III. Impact Due to very limited use of the function in the existing applications, and limited length of the overflow, exploitation of the vulnerability does not seem feasible. None of the utilities and daemons in the base system are known to be vulnerable. However, careful review of third party software that may use the function was not performed. IV. Workaround No workaround is available. V. Solution Perform one of the following: 1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date. 2) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch: Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64 platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility: # freebsd-update fetch # freebsd-update install Restart all daemons that use the library, or reboot the system. 3) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch: The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable FreeBSD release branches. a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. [*** v1.1 NOTE ***] If your sources are not yet patched using the initially published patch, then you need to apply libc.patch. If your sources are already updated, or patched with patch from the initial advisory, then you need to apply the incremental patch, named libc-inc.patch. [FreeBSD system, not patched with initial SA-16:37 patch] # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-16:37/libc.patch # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-16:37/libc.patch.asc # gpg --verify libc.patch.asc [FreeBSD system, initial SA-16:37 patch already applied] # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-16:37/libc-inc.patch # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-16:37/libc-inc.patch.asc # gpg --verify libc-inc.patch.asc b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root: # cd /usr/src # patch < /path/to/patch c) Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as described in . Restart all daemons that use the library, or reboot the system. VI. Correction details The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each affected branch. Branch/path Revision - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- stable/9/ r309691 releng/9.3/ r309697 stable/10/ r309690 releng/10.1/ r309696 releng/10.2/ r309694 releng/10.3/ r309693 stable/11/ r309689 releng/11.0/ r309692 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a machine with Subversion installed: # svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number: VII. References The latest revision of this advisory is available at -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJYSNoxAAoJEO1n7NZdz2rnQfQP/0oJ8WdTTVMpjEHRBQ7WbayB f7Y8MeVFErNLL8caQDxRyiF/ex07m5m2morik84ggDTkHiWnllaP0H3MadivP9Ly XspViMU73r49PmYTAsrMARyW2ncufgGpsvaEcVOVKEAiwcm0ATu7gnTf+cyrfWoe k9HlTS18bN18zQ/FFSJPjmIsTh8Cb+cdF6SrVEt7bIcoVzZWMU/sDJP9JDnRFa3+ o7bWDQg3kfA8k3XEzrL9FSO52Sr9jNslZGAaycFFQjxecgC/05mTbqPsJOpdhkaC mfcARX/8+iwxsE/3h7R5OK6vsu6piUE6vi8HsnTwK7ZMz/IYkPpe4C9WroRYAG29 mqBl+qdVElk/DXPgsz6F7PHqG3SUY3Kkn/bMGT4B3yLjNvWs4+pjh74uyvVLPKkQ meQEs3VLl+c0VkpAxbieMS1KChJwBAKAD7Cevg83YfosC8/LFRoqS6kofjXjVqCd dd0cSWyOE6y/eFy2187lncnz1BNW1Eg8AEH02vEkXOI5hrnhmO6t0cH9dQcj3nHa 6yULqFHJJJGsGqPD1/FkXjn7hAMKsMMROCGpY0txNVA2a3Z6zf593nZL7Vr1nPy7 7C7/sKToSilR3OJGoSFxNlRHqkgb08dQOzsof/355M94baKw82QAULuQoOBYu0DU PZ21bNtGfZSN4rThyVuQ =Id1+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----