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Date:      Sun, 17 Dec 2000 14:39:32 -0500 (EST)
From:      Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>
To:        freebsd-security@FreeBSD.org
Cc:        freebsd-arch@FreeBSD.org
Subject:   Removing #ifdefs on LOGIN_CAP?
Message-ID:  <Pine.NEB.3.96L.1001217143505.48123N-100000@fledge.watson.org>

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As part of the mandatory access control implementation, I'm using the
capabilities database (/etc/login.conf) to add label information to user
classes; in this manner, each user is mapped to appropriate mandatory
policy restrictions and rights.  To do this, I've introduced
LOGIN_SETLABEL as an option to setusercontext(), which extracts the
labeling information, and applies it to user processes at login.  This has
a number of impacts -- first, it requires that programs use
setusercontext() when working with user context information, rather than
manually diddling with uid's, which is probably a good thing.  It also
requires the programs start correctly using LOGIN_SETALL rather than
manually contructing masks (a bit of work -- I updated su to do this a
couple of weeks ago, but work remains to be done in other programs).  This
raises the following issue: currently, the login capability code is
ifdef'd by LOGIN_CAP throughout the source tree, and in many cases,
alternative implementations of context management code exist in an #else. 
Do we know if anyone still uses the old code?  Would there be any
objections to transitioning to only using setusercontext() and the login
capabilities database rather than retaining the old implementations,
giving us a consistent implementation throughout and allowing the
capability database to hold additional per-user/class security properties? 

I also plan to use login.conf to hold information on privileges
(capabilities) that users are allowed to acquire via su as well as
configuring per-user audit properties, so there are other applications
that will use this also.

Robert N M Watson             FreeBSD Core Team, TrustedBSD Project
robert@fledge.watson.org      NAI Labs, Safeport Network Services



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