Date: Mon, 29 Oct 2018 18:07:40 +0000 (UTC) From: Bernard Spil <brnrd@FreeBSD.org> To: ports-committers@freebsd.org, svn-ports-all@freebsd.org, svn-ports-head@freebsd.org Subject: svn commit: r483393 - in head/security/openssl111: . files Message-ID: <201810291807.w9TI7eeg048928@repo.freebsd.org>
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Author: brnrd Date: Mon Oct 29 18:07:39 2018 New Revision: 483393 URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/ports/483393 Log: security/openssl111: Fix vulnerabilities MFH: 2018Q4 Security: 238ae7de-dba2-11e8-b713-b499baebfeaf Added: head/security/openssl111/files/patch-CVE-2018-0734 (contents, props changed) head/security/openssl111/files/patch-CVE-2018-0735 (contents, props changed) Modified: head/security/openssl111/Makefile Modified: head/security/openssl111/Makefile ============================================================================== --- head/security/openssl111/Makefile Mon Oct 29 17:58:14 2018 (r483392) +++ head/security/openssl111/Makefile Mon Oct 29 18:07:39 2018 (r483393) @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ PORTNAME= openssl DISTVERSION= 1.1.1 -PORTREVISION= 1 +PORTREVISION= 2 CATEGORIES= security devel MASTER_SITES= https://www.openssl.org/source/ \ ftp://ftp.cert.dfn.de/pub/tools/net/openssl/source/ Added: head/security/openssl111/files/patch-CVE-2018-0734 ============================================================================== --- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added) +++ head/security/openssl111/files/patch-CVE-2018-0734 Mon Oct 29 18:07:39 2018 (r483393) @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +Timing vulnerability in DSA signature generation (CVE-2018-0734). + +Avoid a timing attack that leaks information via a side channel that +triggers when a BN is resized. Increasing the size of the BNs +prior to doing anything with them suppresses the attack. + +Thanks due to Samuel Weiser for finding and locating this. + +Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> +(Merged from #7486) + +(cherry picked from commit a9cfb8c) + +https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/8abfe72e8c1de1b95f50aa0d9134803b4d00070f +--- crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c.orig 2018-09-11 12:48:21 UTC ++++ crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c +@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ + + #include <stdio.h> + #include "internal/cryptlib.h" ++#include "internal/bn_int.h" + #include <openssl/bn.h> + #include <openssl/sha.h> + #include "dsa_locl.h" +@@ -178,9 +179,9 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_C + { + BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; + BIGNUM *k, *kinv = NULL, *r = *rp; +- BIGNUM *l, *m; ++ BIGNUM *l; + int ret = 0; +- int q_bits; ++ int q_bits, q_words; + + if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) { + DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS); +@@ -189,8 +190,7 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_C + + k = BN_new(); + l = BN_new(); +- m = BN_new(); +- if (k == NULL || l == NULL || m == NULL) ++ if (k == NULL || l == NULL) + goto err; + + if (ctx_in == NULL) { +@@ -201,9 +201,9 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_C + + /* Preallocate space */ + q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q); +- if (!BN_set_bit(k, q_bits) +- || !BN_set_bit(l, q_bits) +- || !BN_set_bit(m, q_bits)) ++ q_words = bn_get_top(dsa->q); ++ if (!bn_wexpand(k, q_words + 2) ++ || !bn_wexpand(l, q_words + 2)) + goto err; + + /* Get random k */ +@@ -238,14 +238,17 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_C + * small timing information leakage. We then choose the sum that is + * one bit longer than the modulus. + * +- * TODO: revisit the BN_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic +- * conditional copy. ++ * There are some concerns about the efficacy of doing this. More ++ * specificly refer to the discussion starting with: ++ * https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7486#discussion_r228323705 ++ * The fix is to rework BN so these gymnastics aren't required. + */ + if (!BN_add(l, k, dsa->q) +- || !BN_add(m, l, dsa->q) +- || !BN_copy(k, BN_num_bits(l) > q_bits ? l : m)) ++ || !BN_add(k, l, dsa->q)) + goto err; + ++ BN_consttime_swap(BN_is_bit_set(l, q_bits), k, l, q_words + 2); ++ + if ((dsa)->meth->bn_mod_exp != NULL) { + if (!dsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(dsa, r, dsa->g, k, dsa->p, ctx, + dsa->method_mont_p)) +@@ -258,7 +261,7 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_C + if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx)) + goto err; + +- /* Compute part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */ ++ /* Compute part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */ + if ((kinv = BN_mod_inverse(NULL, k, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL) + goto err; + +@@ -273,7 +276,6 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_C + BN_CTX_free(ctx); + BN_clear_free(k); + BN_clear_free(l); +- BN_clear_free(m); + return ret; + } + Added: head/security/openssl111/files/patch-CVE-2018-0735 ============================================================================== --- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added) +++ head/security/openssl111/files/patch-CVE-2018-0735 Mon Oct 29 18:07:39 2018 (r483393) @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +Timing vulnerability in ECDSA signature generation (CVE-2018-0735) + +Preallocate an extra limb for some of the big numbers to avoid a reallocation +that can potentially provide a side channel. + +Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> +(Merged from #7486) + +(cherry picked from commit 99540ec) + +https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20181029.txt +--- crypto/ec/ec_mult.c.orig 2018-09-11 12:48:21 UTC ++++ crypto/ec/ec_mult.c +@@ -206,8 +206,8 @@ int ec_scalar_mul_ladder(const EC_GROUP + */ + cardinality_bits = BN_num_bits(cardinality); + group_top = bn_get_top(cardinality); +- if ((bn_wexpand(k, group_top + 1) == NULL) +- || (bn_wexpand(lambda, group_top + 1) == NULL)) { ++ if ((bn_wexpand(k, group_top + 2) == NULL) ++ || (bn_wexpand(lambda, group_top + 2) == NULL)) { + ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } +@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ int ec_scalar_mul_ladder(const EC_GROUP + * k := scalar + 2*cardinality + */ + kbit = BN_is_bit_set(lambda, cardinality_bits); +- BN_consttime_swap(kbit, k, lambda, group_top + 1); ++ BN_consttime_swap(kbit, k, lambda, group_top + 2); + + group_top = bn_get_top(group->field); + if ((bn_wexpand(s->X, group_top) == NULL)
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