From owner-freebsd-bugs@FreeBSD.ORG Wed Apr 3 15:00:01 2013 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-bugs@smarthost.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.FreeBSD.org [8.8.178.115]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 581BDED2 for ; Wed, 3 Apr 2013 15:00:01 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from gnats@FreeBSD.org) Received: from freefall.freebsd.org (freefall.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206c::16:87]) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4A87B703 for ; Wed, 3 Apr 2013 15:00:01 +0000 (UTC) Received: from freefall.freebsd.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by freefall.freebsd.org (8.14.6/8.14.6) with ESMTP id r33F01D1091680 for ; Wed, 3 Apr 2013 15:00:01 GMT (envelope-from gnats@freefall.freebsd.org) Received: (from gnats@localhost) by freefall.freebsd.org (8.14.6/8.14.6/Submit) id r33F01hr091679; Wed, 3 Apr 2013 15:00:01 GMT (envelope-from gnats) Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2013 15:00:01 GMT Message-Id: <201304031500.r33F01hr091679@freefall.freebsd.org> To: freebsd-bugs@FreeBSD.org Cc: From: Mark Knight Subject: Re: conf/177607: named.conf comment to slave root suggests potentially dangerous BIND configuration X-BeenThere: freebsd-bugs@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.14 Precedence: list Reply-To: Mark Knight List-Id: Bug reports List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 03 Apr 2013 15:00:01 -0000 The following reply was made to PR conf/177607; it has been noted by GNATS. From: Mark Knight To: Maxim Konovalov Cc: bug-followup@freebsd.org Subject: Re: conf/177607: named.conf comment to slave root suggests potentially dangerous BIND configuration Date: Wed, 03 Apr 2013 15:51:35 +0100 Thanks for fixing up the Repy-To. I stupidly uncommented these lines on a box *assuming* it was safe. Once upon a time responding to root DNS queries wouldn't have been considered a bad thing. However today I received an abuse@ report to thank me for my error. The comment above the stanza doesn't mention the amplifier threat (although it does mention general caution) and appears to offer a good suggestion for improving resilience and reducing net traffic that's "ready to run". Clearly it isn't. My rationale was that it's a quick and easy fix and given the recent attacks it was worth giving this a high priority in the name of pro-active security. It's a potential security issue and is therefore serious. Apologies if I've exaggerated the threat.