Date: Wed, 22 Aug 2001 12:01:19 -0400 (EDT) From: Mike Silbersack <silby@silby.com> To: Kris Kennaway <kris@obsecurity.org> Cc: Mike Silbersack <silby@FreeBSD.org>, <cvs-committers@FreeBSD.org>, <cvs-all@FreeBSD.org> Subject: Re: cvs commit: src/sys/netinet tcp_input.c tcp_seq.h tcp_subr.c tcp_timer.c tcp_usrreq.c tcp_var.h Message-ID: <Pine.BSF.4.30.0108221155590.36084-100000@niwun.pair.com> In-Reply-To: <20010821195920.A23850@xor.obsecurity.org>
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On Tue, 21 Aug 2001, Kris Kennaway wrote: > On Tue, Aug 21, 2001 at 05:58:16PM -0700, Mike Silbersack wrote: > > In order to ensure security and functionality, RFC 1948 style > > initial sequence number generation has been implemented. Barring > > any major crypographic breakthroughs, this algorithm should be > > unbreakable. > > Except by brute force. A 32-bit sequence number just isn't naturally > very resistent to guessing, and on a fast connection, under favourable > circumstances, an attacker could simply cycle through them all. > > Kris True, I suppose that could become feasible as more bandwidth becomes available. When it does, I guess we'll have to add rate limiting of some sort to incoming SYNs from the same host if too many bad ones are received. RST attacks would be hard to stop in the face of such an attack, though. I'm not going to worry about it: I don't have any boxes with enough bandwidth for the attack to work on. :) Mike "Silby" Silbersack To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe cvs-all" in the body of the message
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