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Date:      Mon, 20 Sep 1999 03:03:07 -0600 (MDT)
From:      Jobe <jobe@attrition.org>
To:        "Rodney W. Grimes" <freebsd@gndrsh.dnsmgr.net>
Cc:        security@FreeBSD.ORG
Subject:   Re: Real-time alarms
Message-ID:  <Pine.LNX.3.96.990920011230.13128K-100000@forced.attrition.org>
In-Reply-To: <199909200718.AAA58050@gndrsh.dnsmgr.net>

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On Mon, 20 Sep 1999, Rodney W. Grimes wrote:

> > 
> > 
> > On Sun, 19 Sep 1999, Rodney W. Grimes wrote:
> > 
> > *snipped*
> > > > I guess it that case we need to start discussing the events that need to
> > > > generate alarms. 
> > > 
> > > Slow down, your jumped from ``auditing'' to ``alarms'', as Nate points out
> > > in his mail there really is 2 levels of functionality here.  The in kernel
> > > ``this is what I have done'' auditing mechansim, and the other side that
> > > does the filtering and decides what is and is not important.  It's not
> > > that important where the 2 pieces live at this time, but it is important
> > > to decide up front that it is 2 pieces.
> > > 
> > > Myself, I like the idea of how bpf handles the filtering side.  Compile
> > > up an expression and shove it into the kernel so you minimize copy out
> > > operations.
> > > 
> > > > Also we need to look at how in depth we want to go.  In
> > > > addition, what are our goals here?  What is it exactly that we want to be
> > > > notified of.  Do we consider a single 'unprivilledged' account compromise
> > > > a breach of security?  If so, how do you plan to go about auditing the
> > > > validity of logins.  I think once a list of rogue events is created we can
> > > > start getting the ball rolling on this.  I think it is silly to design the
> > > > system before we even know what we are trying to monitor.  Once we derive
> > > > the events that will generate the alarms implementation of the alarming
> > > > system becomes easy.  It seems to me that we're trying to bake a pie with
> > > > no filling here.
> > > 
> > > I think your trying to set policy before we even have a method, though Nate
> > > and Robert Watson look to have a lot of the method work done.  We need to
> > > go dig the differenet pieces before the group and look at what we have
> > > already implemented and come up with what we want for a method.  Besides
> > > Nate and Roberts work there is jdp work for filesystem modification to
> > > look at as well.
> > 
> > I think my references to userland scenarios threw us off the track.
> > Basically what I was trying to get at is that we really need to know what
> > 'events' (in kernel happenings) that we want to be aware of.  Otherwise we
> > will end up developing a method for generating alarms for kernel events
> > when there are no given events to generate alarms for.  Do you see what
> > I'm trying to get at here?  Or is our primary goal to just create the
> > auditing system and let the user define the events for which alarms are
> > generated?
> 
> I am trying to seperate ``method'' from ``policy''.  The primary goal, IMHO,
> should be to create a method of getting events from the kernel that could be
> used to implement all sorts of security policies.  So basically your last
> statement ``create the auditing system and let the user define the events''
> is what I am after first.  Then we can implement the tools that allow
> the user to define the events that create alarms or what have you.

Why not just have something that uses SYS_write() to write to a file possibly 
/dev/audit?  Just have a create_alert(const char *fmt, ...) function
(with accompanying va_args code) and just ship the data via SYS_write()
directly to the device.  Of course we'd still need to implement a method
in the kernel to prevent lkms from wrapping our SYS_write().  Do we really
want anyone to be able wrap SYS_write(), or many of the other syscalls,
anyways? We'd also make the device appending only, etc, etc.  Am I missing
something again?

--Jobe

> 
> -- 
> Rod Grimes - KD7CAX - (RWG25)                    rgrimes@gndrsh.dnsmgr.net
> 
> 
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