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Date:      Wed, 11 Nov 2015 03:22:07 +0000 (UTC)
From:      Jason Unovitch <junovitch@FreeBSD.org>
To:        ports-committers@freebsd.org, svn-ports-all@freebsd.org, svn-ports-head@freebsd.org
Subject:   svn commit: r401224 - head/security/vuxml
Message-ID:  <201511110322.tAB3M7HR033610@repo.freebsd.org>

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Author: junovitch
Date: Wed Nov 11 03:22:07 2015
New Revision: 401224
URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/ports/401224

Log:
  Document Xen XSAs-{142,148,149,150,151,152,153}
  
  Security:	CVE-2015-7311
  Security:	CVE-2015-7835
  Security:	CVE-2015-7969
  Security:	CVE-2015-7970
  Security:	CVE-2015-7971
  Security:	CVE-2015-7972
  Security:	https://vuxml.FreeBSD.org/freebsd/301b04d7-881c-11e5-ab94-002590263bf5.html
  Security:	https://vuxml.FreeBSD.org/freebsd/3d9f6260-881d-11e5-ab94-002590263bf5.html
  Security:	https://vuxml.FreeBSD.org/freebsd/83350009-881e-11e5-ab94-002590263bf5.html
  Security:	https://vuxml.FreeBSD.org/freebsd/c0e76d33-8821-11e5-ab94-002590263bf5.html
  Security:	https://vuxml.FreeBSD.org/freebsd/e3792855-881f-11e5-ab94-002590263bf5.html
  Security:	https://vuxml.FreeBSD.org/freebsd/e4848ca4-8820-11e5-ab94-002590263bf5.html
  Security:	https://vuxml.FreeBSD.org/freebsd/fc1f8795-881d-11e5-ab94-002590263bf5.html

Modified:
  head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml

Modified: head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml
==============================================================================
--- head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml	Wed Nov 11 02:16:23 2015	(r401223)
+++ head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml	Wed Nov 11 03:22:07 2015	(r401224)
@@ -58,6 +58,247 @@ Notes:
 
 -->
 <vuxml xmlns="http://www.vuxml.org/apps/vuxml-1">;
+  <vuln vid="c0e76d33-8821-11e5-ab94-002590263bf5">
+    <topic>xen-tools -- populate-on-demand balloon size inaccuracy can crash guests</topic>
+    <affects>
+      <package>
+	<name>xen-tools</name>
+	<range><ge>3.4</ge><lt>4.5.1_2</lt></range>
+      </package>
+    </affects>
+    <description>
+      <body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">;
+	<p>The Xen Project reports:</p>
+	<blockquote cite="http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-153.html">;
+	  <p>Guests configured with PoD might be unstable, especially under
+	    load. In an affected guest, an unprivileged guest user might be
+	    able to cause a guest crash, perhaps simply by applying load so
+	    as to cause heavy memory pressure within the guest.</p>
+	</blockquote>
+      </body>
+    </description>
+    <references>
+      <cvename>CVE-2015-7972</cvename>
+      <url>http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-153.html</url>;
+    </references>
+    <dates>
+      <discovery>2015-10-29</discovery>
+      <entry>2015-11-11</entry>
+    </dates>
+  </vuln>
+
+  <vuln vid="e4848ca4-8820-11e5-ab94-002590263bf5">
+    <topic>xen-kernel -- some pmu and profiling hypercalls log without rate limiting</topic>
+    <affects>
+      <package>
+	<name>xen-kernel</name>
+	<range><ge>3.2</ge><lt>4.5.1_1</lt></range>
+      </package>
+    </affects>
+    <description>
+      <body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">;
+	<p>The Xen Project reports:</p>
+	<blockquote cite="http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-152.html">;
+	  <p>HYPERCALL_xenoprof_op and HYPERVISOR_xenpmu_op log some errors and
+	    attempts at invalid operations. These log messages are not
+	    rate-limited, even though they can be triggered by guests.</p>
+	  <p>A malicious guest could cause repeated logging to the hypervisor
+	    console, leading to a Denial of Service attack.</p>
+	</blockquote>
+      </body>
+    </description>
+    <references>
+      <cvename>CVE-2015-7971</cvename>
+      <url>http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-152.html</url>;
+    </references>
+    <dates>
+      <discovery>2015-10-29</discovery>
+      <entry>2015-11-11</entry>
+    </dates>
+  </vuln>
+
+  <vuln vid="e3792855-881f-11e5-ab94-002590263bf5">
+    <topic>xen-kernel -- leak of per-domain profiling-related vcpu pointer array</topic>
+    <affects>
+      <package>
+	<name>xen-kernel</name>
+	<range><ge>4.0</ge><lt>4.5.1_1</lt></range>
+      </package>
+    </affects>
+    <description>
+      <body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">;
+	<p>The Xen Project reports:</p>
+	<blockquote cite="http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-151.html">;
+	  <p>A domain's xenoprofile state contains an array of per-vcpu
+	    information... This array is leaked on domain teardown. This memory
+	    leak could -- over time -- exhaust the host's memory.</p>
+	  <p>The following parties can mount a denial of service attack
+	    affecting the whole system:</p>
+	  <ul>
+	    <li>A malicious guest administrator via XENOPROF_get_buffer.</li>
+	    <li>A domain given suitable privilege over another domain via
+	       XENOPROF_set_passive (this would usually be a domain being
+	       used to profile another domain, eg with the xenoprof tool).</li>
+	  </ul>
+	  <p>The ability to also restart or create suitable domains is also
+	    required to fully exploit the issue. Without this the leak is
+	    limited to a small multiple of the maximum number of vcpus for the
+	    domain.</p>
+	</blockquote>
+      </body>
+    </description>
+    <references>
+      <cvename>CVE-2015-7969</cvename>
+      <url>http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-151.html</url>;
+    </references>
+    <dates>
+      <discovery>2015-10-29</discovery>
+      <entry>2015-11-11</entry>
+    </dates>
+  </vuln>
+
+  <vuln vid="83350009-881e-11e5-ab94-002590263bf5">
+    <topic>xen-kernel -- Long latency populate-on-demand operation is not preemptible</topic>
+    <affects>
+      <package>
+	<name>xen-kernel</name>
+	<range><ge>3.4</ge><lt>4.5.1_1</lt></range>
+      </package>
+    </affects>
+    <description>
+      <body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">;
+	<p>The Xen Project reports:</p>
+	<blockquote cite="http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-150.html">;
+	  <p>When running an HVM domain in Populate-on-Demand mode, Xen would
+	    sometimes search the domain for memory to reclaim, in response to
+	    demands for population of other pages in the same domain. This
+	    search runs without preemption.  The guest can, by suitable
+	    arrangement of its memory contents, create a situation where this
+	    search is a time-consuming linear scan of the guest's address
+	    space.</p>
+	  <p>A malicious HVM guest administrator can cause a denial of service.
+	    Specifically, prevent use of a physical CPU for a significant
+	    period.</p>
+	</blockquote>
+      </body>
+    </description>
+    <references>
+      <cvename>CVE-2015-7970</cvename>
+      <url>http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-150.html</url>;
+    </references>
+    <dates>
+      <discovery>2015-10-29</discovery>
+      <entry>2015-11-11</entry>
+    </dates>
+  </vuln>
+
+  <vuln vid="fc1f8795-881d-11e5-ab94-002590263bf5">
+    <topic>xen-kernel -- leak of main per-domain vcpu pointer array</topic>
+    <affects>
+      <package>
+	<name>xen-kernel</name>
+	<range><lt>4.5.1_1</lt></range>
+      </package>
+    </affects>
+    <description>
+      <body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">;
+	<p>The Xen Project reports:</p>
+	<blockquote cite="http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-149.html">;
+	  <p>A domain's primary array of vcpu pointers can be allocated by a
+	    toolstack exactly once in the lifetime of a domain via the
+	    XEN_DOMCTL_max_vcpus hypercall. This array is leaked on domain
+	    teardown. This memory leak could -- over time -- exhaust the host's
+	    memory.</p>
+	  <p>A domain given partial management control via XEN_DOMCTL_max_vcpus
+	    can mount a denial of service attack affecting the whole system. The
+	    ability to also restart or create suitable domains is also required
+	    to fully exploit the issue.  Without this the leak is limited to a
+	    small multiple of the maximum number of vcpus for the domain. The
+	    maximum leak is 64kbytes per domain (re)boot (less on ARM).</p>
+	</blockquote>
+      </body>
+    </description>
+    <references>
+      <cvename>CVE-2015-7969</cvename>
+      <url>http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-149.html</url>;
+    </references>
+    <dates>
+      <discovery>2015-10-29</discovery>
+      <entry>2015-11-11</entry>
+    </dates>
+  </vuln>
+
+  <vuln vid="3d9f6260-881d-11e5-ab94-002590263bf5">
+    <topic>xen-kernel -- Uncontrolled creation of large page mappings by PV guests</topic>
+    <affects>
+      <package>
+	<name>xen-kernel</name>
+	<range><ge>3.4</ge><lt>4.5.1_1</lt></range>
+      </package>
+    </affects>
+    <description>
+      <body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">;
+	<p>The Xen Project reports:</p>
+	<blockquote cite="http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-148.html">;
+	  <p>The code to validate level 2 page table entries is bypassed when
+	    certain conditions are satisfied. This means that a PV guest can
+	    create writeable mappings using super page mappings. Such writeable
+	    mappings can violate Xen intended invariants for pages which Xen is
+	    supposed to keep read-only. This is possible even if the
+	    "allowsuperpage" command line option is not used.</p>
+	  <p>Malicious PV guest administrators can escalate privilege so as to
+	    control the whole system.</p>
+	</blockquote>
+      </body>
+    </description>
+    <references>
+      <cvename>CVE-2015-7835</cvename>
+      <url>http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-148.html</url>;
+    </references>
+    <dates>
+      <discovery>2015-10-29</discovery>
+      <entry>2015-11-11</entry>
+    </dates>
+  </vuln>
+
+  <vuln vid="301b04d7-881c-11e5-ab94-002590263bf5">
+    <topic>xen-tools -- libxl fails to honour readonly flag on disks with qemu-xen</topic>
+    <affects>
+      <package>
+	<name>xen-tools</name>
+	<range><ge>4.1</ge><lt>4.5.1_1</lt></range>
+      </package>
+    </affects>
+    <description>
+      <body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">;
+	<p>The Xen Project reports:</p>
+	<blockquote cite="http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-142.html">;
+	  <p>Callers of libxl can specify that a disk should be read-only to the
+	    guest. However, there is no code in libxl to pass this information
+	    to qemu-xen (the upstream-based qemu); and indeed there is no way in
+	    qemu to make a disk read-only.</p>
+	  <p>The vulnerability is exploitable only via devices emulated by the
+	    device model, not the parallel PV devices for supporting PVHVM.
+	    Normally the PVHVM device unplug protocol renders the emulated
+	    devices inaccessible early in boot.</p>
+	  <p>Malicious guest administrators or (in some situations) users may be
+	    able to write to supposedly read-only disk images.</p>
+	  <p>CDROM devices (that is, devices specified to be presented to the
+	    guest as CDROMs, regardless of the nature of the backing storage on
+	    the host) are not affected.</p>
+	</blockquote>
+      </body>
+    </description>
+    <references>
+      <cvename>CVE-2015-7311</cvename>
+      <url>http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-142.html</url>;
+    </references>
+    <dates>
+      <discovery>2015-09-22</discovery>
+      <entry>2015-11-11</entry>
+    </dates>
+  </vuln>
+
   <vuln vid="2f7f4db2-8819-11e5-ab94-002590263bf5">
     <topic>p5-HTML-Scrubber -- XSS vulnerability</topic>
     <affects>



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