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Date:      Tue, 07 Sep 1999 02:08:28 -0700
From:      dmp@aracnet.com
To:        "Rodney W. Grimes" <freebsd@gndrsh.dnsmgr.net>
Cc:        Gary Palmer <gpalmer@FreeBSD.ORG>, freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG
Subject:   Re: Layer 2 ethernet encryption?
Message-ID:  <37D4D60C.8AF45A7B@aracnet.com>
References:  <199909070656.XAA04873@gndrsh.dnsmgr.net>

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"Rodney W. Grimes" wrote:
> > "Rodney W. Grimes" wrote:
> > > > dmp@aracnet.com wrote in message ID
> > > > <37D496A5.A0576E0F@aracnet.com>:
> > > > > Is it possible to encrypt ethernet packets so that all layers above
> > > > > layer 2 would be encrypted?  The idea I had was to make a device that
> > > > > could defeat a TCP sniffer by encrypting the IP headers.  Is this
> > > > > doable?  Viable?  A reinvention of the wheel?
> > > >
> > > > How would you route the traffic?  No routers would be able to pass the
> > > > traffic.
> > >
> > > No, only routers knowing the key would be able to route traffic.
> >
> > In my idea, only the machine to which the packet is being sent would
> > have the decryption key.  If the router had the decryption key, it
> > would mean that it would have to be programmable for it to load the
> > right decryption key.
> 
> Usually one key per interface, not a big deal, and required for what
> I was discussing since this even encrypts the MAC address.

However, that means that every device on the network must have a key.
For devices like routers and switches, which don't provide absolute
control over security, allowing them to de/encrypt traffic is a
security hole.  With only the workstations and servers having keys
and running open-source software, there are fewer security holes,
plus a far greater level of control can be exercised.

> > That opens a security hole in which a DoS
> > could be executed by corrupting the router's keys.  The router's key
> > cache would also have to be retrivable, making it possible to steal
> > the keys from the router.
> 
> You can't corrupt the router key unless you know the key, it won't
> hear you unless your data is properly encrypted.  Remeber this is
> layer 1 encryption, so you have to know the key to encrypt the MAC
> to get the router to even listen to you.

With that method, the packet has to be decrypted, analysed, then
reencrypted at each hop, making each hop a security risk.

By having the source encrypt the packet to the destination's key,
leaving layer 2 intact, the packet can remain encrypted for the
entire trip, with only the source and destination knowing the real
nature of the data being sent.

> You can steal ``physcially'' steal the keys from the router itself,
> but then we would have to post armed gards as others mentioned to
> stop physical access attacks.

Well, they aren't armed, at least not with guns.  Not the ones inside
the building, any way.  A lot of computer equipment doesn't react
well to bullets.  :-)


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