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Date:      Sat, 17 Jul 1999 11:35:41 +0300 (EDT)
From:      "Valentin Nechayev" <nx@nn.kiev.ua>
To:        freebsd-hackers@freebsd.org
Subject:   Re: Replacement for grep(1) (part 2)
Message-ID:  <ABT14ati-3@nn.kiev.ua>
References:  <Pine.BSF.4.10.9907140045180.96614-100000@janus.syracuse.net>

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Brian F. Feldman wrote:

>>     There are other ways.  For example, even if a user account is resource
>>     limited, root processes (such as sendmail, popper, identd, and so forth)
>>     are not.  Attacks against these servers generally result in very high
>>     loads and sometimes make it difficult to login to fix the problem, but do
>>     not result in running out of swap.

It results sometimes in out of swap, too.

> Inetd is rate-limited by default nowadays, so this really doesn't apply.

It really does apply. Inetd limits incoming connections per minute, not per
second. It is possible to use minute limit in a few seconds and cause a high
load. Sendmail is worse than inetd; it cannot limit incoming rate on
established connection. Butenko's (butenko@stalker.com) DoS attack to
sendmail is to send thousands of letters to local user thru fast
netork connection (i.e., Ethernet) thru one established TCP connection; the
only barrier is testing of LA before sending '250 XXX message accepted to
delivery' reply and fork-and-deliver-or-queue-and-exit decision, but
attacker can send too many letters in few seconds; a hundreds of delivery
processes locked on /usr/libexec/mail.local mailbox waiting. LA counts
system state characteristics of last minute and thus is similar to average
patients' temperature per hospital per last year. ;( I have seen a variant
of this attack on my mail hosts, when host with 6000 letters in mail queue
(mail2news server) sent all its mail to smarthost (uucp spool server); after
~500 letters, sendmail on smarthost closed port 25 on RefuseLA; it was saved
from out-of-swap only because domain resolving spent some time. The only
mechanism against such type of attack I can imagine is to sm_sleep(1) at
"mail from:" smtp server code or before '250 Message accepted for delivery'.
For inetd, we must limit connections per second, not per minute.

--
Netch




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