From owner-svn-ports-all@freebsd.org Wed Jan 6 00:49:40 2016 Return-Path: Delivered-To: svn-ports-all@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206a::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EA1FCA63ECD; Wed, 6 Jan 2016 00:49:40 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from junovitch@FreeBSD.org) Received: from repo.freebsd.org (repo.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:6068::e6a:0]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A912C1E31; Wed, 6 Jan 2016 00:49:40 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from junovitch@FreeBSD.org) Received: from repo.freebsd.org ([127.0.1.37]) by repo.freebsd.org (8.15.2/8.15.2) with ESMTP id u060ndFq035796; Wed, 6 Jan 2016 00:49:39 GMT (envelope-from junovitch@FreeBSD.org) Received: (from junovitch@localhost) by repo.freebsd.org (8.15.2/8.15.2/Submit) id u060ndGE035794; Wed, 6 Jan 2016 00:49:39 GMT (envelope-from junovitch@FreeBSD.org) Message-Id: <201601060049.u060ndGE035794@repo.freebsd.org> X-Authentication-Warning: repo.freebsd.org: junovitch set sender to junovitch@FreeBSD.org using -f From: Jason Unovitch Date: Wed, 6 Jan 2016 00:49:39 +0000 (UTC) To: ports-committers@freebsd.org, svn-ports-all@freebsd.org, svn-ports-head@freebsd.org Subject: svn commit: r405322 - head/security/vuxml X-SVN-Group: ports-head MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-BeenThere: svn-ports-all@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.20 Precedence: list List-Id: SVN commit messages for the ports tree List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 06 Jan 2016 00:49:41 -0000 Author: junovitch Date: Wed Jan 6 00:49:39 2016 New Revision: 405322 URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/ports/405322 Log: Document Xen Security Advisories (XSAs 159, 160, 162, 165, 166) PR: 205841 Security: CVE-2015-8555 Security: CVE-2015-8341 Security: CVE-2015-8339 Security: CVE-2015-8340 Security: https://vuxml.FreeBSD.org/freebsd/6aa2d135-b40e-11e5-9728-002590263bf5.html Security: https://vuxml.FreeBSD.org/freebsd/e839ca04-b40d-11e5-9728-002590263bf5.html Security: https://vuxml.FreeBSD.org/freebsd/5d1d4473-b40d-11e5-9728-002590263bf5.html Security: https://vuxml.FreeBSD.org/freebsd/bcad3faa-b40c-11e5-9728-002590263bf5.html Modified: head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml Modified: head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml ============================================================================== --- head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml Tue Jan 5 23:29:49 2016 (r405321) +++ head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml Wed Jan 6 00:49:39 2016 (r405322) @@ -58,6 +58,161 @@ Notes: --> + + xen-kernel -- ioreq handling possibly susceptible to multiple read issue + + + xen-kernel + 4.5.2_1 + + + + +

The Xen Project reports:

+
Single memory accesses in source code can be translated to multiple + ones in machine code by the compiler, requiring special caution when + accessing shared memory. Such precaution was missing from the + hypervisor code inspecting the state of I/O requests sent to the + device model for assistance.
+
Due to the offending field being a bitfield, it is however believed + that there is no issue in practice, since compilers, at least when + optimizing (which is always the case for non-debug builds), should find + it more expensive to extract the bit field value twice than to keep the + calculated value in a register.
+
This vulnerability is exposed to malicious device models. In + conventional Xen systems this means the qemu which service an HVM + domain. On such systems this vulnerability can only be exploited if + the attacker has gained control of the device model qemu via another + vulnerability.
+
Privilege escalation, host crash (Denial of Service), and leaked + information all cannot be excluded.
+

+ + + + ports/205841 + http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-166.html + + + 2015-12-17 + 2016-01-06 + + + + + xen-kernel -- information leak in legacy x86 FPU/XMM initialization + + + xen-kernel + 4.5.2_1 + + + + +

The Xen Project reports:

+
When XSAVE/XRSTOR are not in use by Xen to manage guest extended + register state, the initial values in the FPU stack and XMM + registers seen by the guest upon first use are those left there by + the previous user of those registers.
+
A malicious domain may be able to leverage this to obtain sensitive + information such as cryptographic keys from another domain.
+

+ + + + CVE-2015-8555 + ports/205841 + http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-165.html + + + 2015-12-17 + 2016-01-06 + + + + + xen-tools -- libxl leak of pv kernel and initrd on error + + + xen-tools + 4.14.5.2_1 + + + + +

The Xen Project reports:

+
When constructing a guest which is configured to use a PV + bootloader which runs as a userspace process in the toolstack domain + (e.g. pygrub) libxl creates a mapping of the files to be used as + kernel and initial ramdisk when building the guest domain.
+
However if building the domain subsequently fails these mappings + would not be released leading to a leak of virtual address space in + the calling process, as well as preventing the recovery of the + temporary disk files containing the kernel and initial ramdisk.
+
For toolstacks which manage multiple domains within the same + process, an attacker who is able to repeatedly start a suitable + domain (or many such domains) can cause an out-of-memory condition in the + toolstack process, leading to a denial of service.
+
Under the same circumstances an attacker can also cause files to + accumulate on the toolstack domain filesystem (usually under /var in + dom0) used to temporarily store the kernel and initial ramdisk, + perhaps leading to a denial of service against arbitrary other + services using that filesystem.
+

+ + + + CVE-2015-8341 + ports/205841 + http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-160.html + + + 2015-12-08 + 2016-01-06 + + + + + xen-kernel -- XENMEM_exchange error handling issues + + + xen-kernel + 4.5.2_1 + + + + +

The Xen Project reports:

+
Error handling in the operation may involve handing back pages to + the domain. This operation may fail when in parallel the domain gets + torn down. So far this failure unconditionally resulted in the host + being brought down due to an internal error being assumed. This is + CVE-2015-8339.
+
Furthermore error handling so far wrongly included the release of a + lock. That lock, however, was either not acquired or already released + on all paths leading to the error handling sequence. This is + CVE-2015-8340.
+
A malicious guest administrator may be able to deny service by + crashing the host or causing a deadlock.
+

+ + + + CVE-2015-8339 + CVE-2015-8340 + ports/205841 + http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-159.html + + + 2015-12-08 + 2016-01-06 + + + tiff -- out-of-bounds read in CIE Lab image format @@ -587,7 +742,7 @@ Notes: xen-tools - 4.5.2 + 4.5.2_1 @@ -631,7 +786,7 @@ Notes: 2015-11-30 2016-01-03 - 2016-01-03 + 2016-01-06