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Date:      Tue, 26 Feb 2002 19:21:37 -0500
From:      Zvezdan Petkovic <zvezdan@CS.WM.EDU>
To:        security@FreeBSD.ORG
Subject:   Re: Third /tmp location ? (and maybe a fourth too)
Message-ID:  <20020226192137.A22734@dali.cs.wm.edu>
In-Reply-To: <3C7C227B.9020100@kpi.com.au>; from johnsa@kpi.com.au on Wed, Feb 27, 2002 at 11:04:11AM %2B1100
References:  <20020226152847.L25859-100000@roble.com> <3C7C227B.9020100@kpi.com.au>

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On Wed, Feb 27, 2002 at 11:04:11AM +1100, Andrew Johns wrote:
> Roger Marquis wrote:
> 
>  >>> File system full errors are typically caused by
>  >>> unnecessary partitioning.  You rarely see them on
>  >>> single-partition systems. Creating symlinks or
>  >>> additional tmp directories to avoid the inevitable
>  >>> drawback of excess partitions is two bads, which don't sum
>  >>>  to a good.  Both also violate the KIS principle.
>  >>>
>  >> Unfortunately, as demonstrated in another reply, the
>  >> optimal partition scheme (/, /usr, /var) is preferred over
>  >>  single partition schemes.
>  >>
>  >
>  > Preferred by who?  Not by the majority of admins I've worked
>  > with over the past couple of decades.  Neither is there any
>  > real gain afforded by a read-only /usr.  /usr had to be
>  > partitioned years ago because it wouldn't fit on the root
>  > disk.  With the introduction of 1GB disks there is no longer
>  >  a good reason to partition /usr though some still
>  > rationalize the practice citing unsubstantiated benefits of
>  > read-only mounts vs read-only permissions.
> 
> It's called Defense in Depth, IIRC.  Rather than "r/o mounts vs
> r/o permissions", it should be "r/o mounts AND r/o perms" to
> afford the greatest depth, although neither of these methods stop
>   anything once someone has root - it will just take them that
> little bit longer to get around it (even if only seconds - 
> note:I'm in agreement that it's basically unsubstantiated, 
> however see below).
> 

system running from CDROM would do the job. A hacker cannot change
/usr/bin/passwd runnning from CDROM.

> 
>  >
>  > Creating a partition for /var is also rarely necessary unless
>  >  your applications require partitioning for performance ,
>  > pseudo-quotas, or they need more disk than the root volume
>  > provides.
>  >
> 
> I remember once seeing a system fill /var with a runaway process 
> that crashed overnight.  Unfortunately all on one partition. 
> System emailed support, they dialled in to fix.  Their dial-up 
> password had expired, they were prompted for new one, system 
> removed passwd file to update, runaway process saw the free space 
> and immediately filled it:
> => nowhere to write new passwd files!
> => passwd files empty
> => no users could log in.
> => no terminals logged in as root (policy), but there were 600 
> users already in...
> 
> I had to pull the plug to reboot it.  This was for a bank and 
> they ran for a whole day (bank terminals stay logged into unix 
> account but with PICK application f/end) without any new logins.
> 
> Having something fill a separately mounted /var would never cause 
> this problem...
> 
> Just a few cents worth...
> 

Excellent example. But as I said before, there are two irreconcilable
shools of thought on this. I tend to be more practical and flexible than
dogmatic. Depending on circumstances and requirements, both choices can
be good.

-- 
Zvezdan Petkovic <zvezdan@cs.wm.edu>
http://www.cs.wm.edu/~zvezdan/

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