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Date:      Tue, 14 Aug 2018 20:21:53 +0000 (UTC)
From:      Cy Schubert <cy@FreeBSD.org>
To:        ports-committers@freebsd.org, svn-ports-all@freebsd.org, svn-ports-head@freebsd.org
Subject:   svn commit: r477201 - head/security/vuxml
Message-ID:  <201808142021.w7EKLrJr011178@repo.freebsd.org>

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Author: cy
Date: Tue Aug 14 20:21:52 2018
New Revision: 477201
URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/ports/477201

Log:
  Document WPA unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data vunlerability.
  
  Security:	CVE-2018-14526

Modified:
  head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml

Modified: head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml
==============================================================================
--- head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml	Tue Aug 14 19:43:40 2018	(r477200)
+++ head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml	Tue Aug 14 20:21:52 2018	(r477201)
@@ -58,6 +58,76 @@ Notes:
   * Do not forget port variants (linux-f10-libxml2, libxml2, etc.)
 -->
 <vuxml xmlns="http://www.vuxml.org/apps/vuxml-1">;
+  <vuln vid="6bedc863-9fbe-11e8-945f-206a8a720317">
+    <topic>wpa_supplicant -- unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data</topic>
+    <affects>
+      <package>
+	<name>wpa_supplicant</name>
+	<range><lt>2.6_2</lt></range>
+      </package>
+      <package>
+	<name>FreeBSD</name>
+	<range><le>10.4_10</le></range>
+	<range><le>11.2_1</le></range>
+      </package>
+    </affects>
+    <description>
+      <body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">;
+	<p>SO-AND-SO reports:</p>
+	<blockquote cite="INSERT URL HERE">
+	  <p>A vulnerability was found in how wpa_supplicant processes
+	     EAPOL-Key frames. It is possible for an attacker to modify
+	     the frame in a way that makes wpa_supplicant decrypt the Key
+	     Data field without requiring a valid MIC value in the frame,
+	     i.e., without the frame being authenticated. This has a
+	     potential issue in the case where WPA2/RSN style of EAPOL-Key
+	     construction is used with TKIP negotiated as the pairwise
+	     cipher. It should be noted that WPA2 is not supposed to be
+	     used with TKIP as the pairwise cipher. Instead, CCMP is
+	     expected to be used and with that pairwise cipher, this
+	     vulnerability is not applicable in practice.</p>
+	  <p>When TKIP is negotiated as the pairwise cipher, the EAPOL-Key
+	     Key Data field is encrypted using RC4. This vulnerability
+	     allows unauthenticated EAPOL-Key frames to be processed and
+	     due to the RC4 design, this makes it possible for an attacker
+	     to modify the plaintext version of the Key Data field with
+	     bitwise XOR operations without knowing the contents.  This can
+	     be used to cause a denial of service attack by modifying
+	     GTK/IGTK on the station (without the attacker learning any of
+	     the keys) which would prevent the station from accepting
+	     received group-addressed frames. Furthermore, this might be
+	     abused by making wpa_supplicant act as a decryption oracle to
+	     try to recover some of the Key Data payload (GTK/IGTK) to get
+	     knowledge of the group encryption keys.</p>
+	  <p>Full recovery of the group encryption keys requires multiple
+	     attempts (128 connection attempts per octet) and each attempt
+	     results in disconnection due to a failure to complete the 4-way
+	     handshake. These failures can result in the AP/network getting
+	     disabled temporarily or even permanently (requiring user action
+	     to re-enable) which may make it impractical to perform the
+	     attack to recover the keys before the AP has already changes
+	     the group keys. By default, wpa_supplicant is enforcing at
+	     minimum a ten second wait time between each failed connection
+	     attempt, i.e., over 20 minutes waiting to recover each octet
+	     while hostapd AP implementation uses 10 minute default for GTK
+	     rekeying when using TKIP. With such timing behavior, practical
+	     attack would need large number of impacted stations to be
+	     trying to connect to the same AP to be able to recover
+	     sufficient information from the GTK to be able to determine
+	     the key before it gets changed.</p>
+	</blockquote>
+      </body>
+    </description>
+    <references>
+      <url>https://w1.fi/security/2018-1/unauthenticated-eapol-key-decryption.txt</url>;
+      <cvename>CVE-2018-14526</cvename>
+    </references>
+    <dates>
+      <discovery>2018-08-08</discovery>
+      <entry>2018-08-14</entry>
+    </dates>
+  </vuln>
+
   <vuln vid="98b603c8-9ff3-11e8-ad63-6451062f0f7a">
     <topic>Flash Player -- multiple vulnerabilities</topic>
     <affects>



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