Skip site navigation (1)Skip section navigation (2)
Date:      Sun, 4 Jan 2009 00:20:23 +0000
From:      RW <rwmaillists@googlemail.com>
To:        freebsd-questions@freebsd.org
Subject:   Re: Foiling MITM attacks on source and ports trees
Message-ID:  <20090104002023.51c7fe5a@gumby.homeunix.com>
In-Reply-To: <20090103184659.GB1253@phenom.cordula.ws>
References:  <20090102164412.GA1258@phenom.cordula.ws> <495E4F24.80209@unsane.co.uk> <20090103013825.18910bf5@gumby.homeunix.com> <20090103184659.GB1253@phenom.cordula.ws>

Next in thread | Previous in thread | Raw E-Mail | Index | Archive | Help
On Sat, 3 Jan 2009 19:46:59 +0100
cpghost <cpghost@cordula.ws> wrote:

> On Sat, Jan 03, 2009 at 01:38:25AM +0000, RW wrote:
> > On Fri, 02 Jan 2009 17:30:12 +0000
> > Vincent Hoffman <vince@unsane.co.uk> wrote:
> > > Admittedly this doesn't give a file by file checksum
> > 
> > That's not really a problem, it's no easier to create a collision
> > in a .gz file than a patch file. 
> > 
> > The more substantial weakness is that the key is verified against a
> > hash stored on the original installation media. If someone went to
> > the trouble of diverting dns or routing to create a fake FreeBSD
> > site they would presumably make it self-consistent down to the ISO
> > checksums.
> 
> That's why I suggested that the list of checksums be digitally signed
> by a private key belonging to The FreeBSD Project. It is assumed that
> getting the corresponding public key would be possible by other means
> not susceptible to MITM attacks (e.g. through endless replication all
> over the net, fingerprint in books etc...).

My point is that having signed updates etc (which is essentially what
freebsd-update and portsnap do) is undermined if the original iso is not
obtained securely. Currently that appears to be the weakest link. 




Want to link to this message? Use this URL: <http://docs.FreeBSD.org/cgi/mid.cgi?20090104002023.51c7fe5a>