Date: Tue, 25 Jun 1996 10:35:46 +0200 (MESZ) From: "Hr.Ladavac" <lada@ws2301.gud.siemens.co.at> To: davidg@root.com Cc: gpalmer@FreeBSD.ORG, vince@mercury.gaianet.net, mark@grumble.grondar.za, hackers@FreeBSD.ORG, security@FreeBSD.ORG, chad@mercury.gaianet.net, jbhunt@mercury.gaianet.net Subject: Re: I need help on this one - please help me track this guy down! Message-ID: <199606250835.AA269621747@ws2301.gud.siemens.co.at> In-Reply-To: <199606250714.AAA03862@root.com> from "David Greenman" at Jun 25, 96 00:14:37 am
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In his e-mail David Greenman wrote: > > >-Vince- wrote in message ID > ><Pine.BSF.3.91.960624232727.21697c-100000@mercury.gaianet.net>: > >> Hmmm, doesn't everyone have . as their path since all . does is allow > >> someone to run stuff from the current directory... > > > >No, everyone does NOT have `.' in their paths! I most certainly don't, > >as I know that it's ALL to easy to have someone break your system > >security that way. Imagine if you are looking into something as root, > >and have `.' in your path. You go into someone elses directory, and do > >a `ls'. All they need is a wrapper program called `ls' in that dir > >which copies /bin/sh to some directory, chowns it to root, then sets > >the setuid bit, and THEN exec's ls with the arguments given, an BANG, > >there goes your system security. > > Actually, this particular problem can be avoided by putting "." last in > the search path rather than first. But Trojan mroe versus okay more can not. Current directory has no place in path. Not even for a normal user. root should not have any path whatsoever; even though this is a tad too paranoid. /Marino > > -DG > > David Greenman > Core-team/Principal Architect, The FreeBSD Project >
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