Date: Tue, 14 Jan 2014 05:27:58 -0800 From: Yuri <yuri@rawbw.com> To: Baptiste Daroussin <bapt@FreeBSD.org> Cc: freebsd-pkg@FreeBSD.org Subject: Re: Does pkg check signatures? Message-ID: <52D53B5E.9020705@rawbw.com> In-Reply-To: <20140114125830.GB77567@ithaqua.etoilebsd.net> References: <52D5269A.5090803@rawbw.com> <52D52926.5090104@infracaninophile.co.uk> <52D530CE.4090908@rawbw.com> <20140114125830.GB77567@ithaqua.etoilebsd.net>
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On 01/14/2014 04:58, Baptiste Daroussin wrote: > What is signed is the catalog which contains the hash of all the available > packages. How is this fingerprint on the local system updated when the remote catalog file changes? > > So the signature is only checked during pkg update in case the database is being > updated not during package installation because it the not needed, the fetched > packages are tested agains their hash. I think this process is very weak. Normal procedure goes like this: * During system installation, public key of the distributor is installed on the local system. One key per repository. Should be verified by admin if this is a concern. * Every downloaded file should be downloaded together with its signature. Signature is computed on the server using the private key of the distributor. * Signature of every single downloaded file should be checked. No exceptions. NSS https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/NSS has all such procedures. Current procedure is flawed for the following reasons: 1. No clear automated process of fingerprint update is defined. (In fact, no secure automated way of its update is possible) 2. Security is opt-in. And it should be opt-out. (There is a big difference) I don't think this fingerprinting scheme can survive a security review. pkgng without proper package signing can't be recommended to users because it is a clear security threat. Yuri
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