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Date:      Mon, 23 Oct 1995 18:10:45 -0600
From:      Nate Williams <nate@rocky.sri.MT.net>
To:        =?KOI8-R?Q?=E1=CE=C4=D2=C5=CA_=FE=C5=D2=CE=CF=D7?= (aka Andrey A. Chernov, Black Mage) <ache@astral.msk.su>
Cc:        Nate Williams <nate@rocky.sri.MT.net>, ache@freefall.freebsd.org, freebsd-hackers@freebsd.org, John Polstra <jdp@polstra.com>
Subject:   Re: ld.so, LD_NOSTD_PATH, and suid/sgid programs
Message-ID:  <199510240010.SAA24195@rocky.sri.MT.net>
In-Reply-To: <Faij2Zmq8S@ache.dialup.demos.ru>
References:  <m0t7SFB-000078C@seattle.polstra.com> <Aagc1ZmOzJ@ache.dialup.demos.ru> <199510232318.RAA24039@rocky.sri.MT.net> <Faij2Zmq8S@ache.dialup.demos.ru>

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> >> >Can you see a security reason for disabling LD_NOSTD_PATH for suid/sgid
> >> >programs?  If not, I think that the recent change should be removed from
> >> >rtld.c.
> >> 
> >> In this case I keep in mind some shell script execution which calls
> >> setuid programs. By setiing LD_NOSTD_PATH user allows such
> >> programs easily fails, it is clear.
> 
> >Why should a program which calls setuid programs fail in the first
> >place?  If they are calling a setuid program it will still only look in
> >the 'normal' places for shlibs, which means they are safe.
> 
> If user set LD_NOSTD_PATH it *NOT* look for normal places anymore.

Then a system shared binary is *completely* and *utterly* useless.
Anyone who writes programs that writes shells scripts that depend on
system routines working with LD_NOSTD_PATH should deserve the error
messages they get.  Why are we un-necessarily complicating the runtime
loader with this?

Given this, I say the change is gratitious and un-needed.



Nate



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