From owner-freebsd-hackers Tue Feb 18 06:56:58 1997 Return-Path: Received: (from root@localhost) by freefall.freebsd.org (8.8.5/8.8.5) id GAA07966 for hackers-outgoing; Tue, 18 Feb 1997 06:56:58 -0800 (PST) Received: from po9.andrew.cmu.edu (PO9.ANDREW.CMU.EDU [128.2.10.109]) by freefall.freebsd.org (8.8.5/8.8.5) with ESMTP id GAA07958 for ; Tue, 18 Feb 1997 06:56:54 -0800 (PST) Received: (from postman@localhost) by po9.andrew.cmu.edu (8.8.2/8.8.2) id JAA04832 for freebsd-hackers@freefall.FreeBSD.org; Tue, 18 Feb 1997 09:56:42 -0500 Received: via switchmail; Tue, 18 Feb 1997 09:56:40 -0500 (EST) Received: from apriori.cc.cmu.edu via qmail ID ; Tue, 18 Feb 1997 09:55:15 -0500 (EST) Received: from apriori.cc.cmu.edu via qmail ID ; Tue, 18 Feb 1997 09:55:13 -0500 (EST) Received: from mms.4.60.Jun.27.1996.03.05.56.sun4.41.EzMail.2.0.CUILIB.3.45.SNAP.NOT.LINKED.apriori.cc.cmu.edu.sun4m.412 via MS.5.6.apriori.cc.cmu.edu.sun4_41; Tue, 18 Feb 1997 09:55:11 -0500 (EST) Message-ID: Date: Tue, 18 Feb 1997 09:55:11 -0500 (EST) From: Robert N Watson To: freebsd-hackers@freefall.FreeBSD.org Subject: Password expire + account expire fields in pwdb Sender: owner-hackers@FreeBSD.ORG X-Loop: FreeBSD.org Precedence: bulk These are very useful fields -- but it would be nice if these blocked login for all locations :). Users can still ssh in long after the account has expired, etc. Would it be possible to implement a pluggable "authenticate" function somewhere? It would take a username, encrypted password string (or unencrypted?), and then authenticate, either returning some true value, or a pointer to a string indicating why authentication failed. This could be "Incorrect login", or "Account Expired", etc. This would require some changes in ports of applications, but would allow for a more consistent approach to login prevention. Presumably it could be patched into popper, ssh, samba, etc. Either that, or scrap the expiration fields -- very few of my users log in without ssh anymore, making the fields a waste of space. :) Not being able to force password changes on ssh in a consistent way is not ideal in our environment. Doing this might coincide nicely with installing pluggable authentication for encryption/secure cards, etc. Robert