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Date:      Tue, 20 Jun 2000 13:48:09 -0400
From:      Christopher Sedore <cmsedore@maxwell.syr.edu>
To:        "'arch@freebsd.org'" <arch@freebsd.org>
Subject:   RE: MORE: Re: kblob discussion.
Message-ID:  <D006CCEB462FD411976100A0C9B413A139E5C2@EXCHANGE>

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>* Christopher Sedore <cmsedore@maxwell.syr.edu> [000620 09:43] wrote:
>> 
>> [...]
>> 
>> >Last night I started thinking about making kblob more flexible,
>> >here's the problem I came across:
>> >
>> >All the papers that have been given to me make sure that once a
>> >0 copy buffer is shared across subsystems it is immutable until
>> >the data it's loaned has gone back to no references except by
>> >the user process.
>> >
>> >Not following the above system is _wrong_.
>> 
>> I'm not sure I would put that level of emphasis on _wrong_.  
>  It deserves
>> that level of emphasis if it can cause kernel state (or other system)
>> corruption (which should be reason for _wrong_, though I'd 
>call this a
>> problem with implementation more than anything else).  If the
>> user/application can only screw up its own data/connections 
>(in the sense of
>> undefined, possibly random data being sent/written), then 
>why not state that
>> modifying the data causes undefined results (including TCP 
>checksum errors,
>> whatever else) and let the programmer beware.
>
>Because it puts undue burden on the rest of the kernel to cope with
>a user's access to internals.  What happens if we are using some
>sort of checksum offloading chipset or encryption/compression system
>that can't stand the data being ripped out from under it.  What's
>the point of recalculating the checksum of a packet when we know
>it shouldn't have changed?
>
>It's wrong. :)

The only access is to data that the user passed in already, so harm should
be limited to incorrect checksums.  I guess I have to agree that ultimately
it would be harder to make sure the kernel could deal with changes in this
area than just to prevent them in the first place.

-Chris


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