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Date:      Fri, 3 Dec 1999 13:06:56 -0700
From:      Nate Williams <nate@mt.sri.com>
To:        Adam Laurie <adam@algroup.co.uk>
Cc:        Nate Williams <nate@mt.sri.com>, "Rodney W. Grimes" <freebsd@gndrsh.dnsmgr.net>, John Baldwin <jhb@FreeBSD.ORG>, freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG
Subject:   Re: rc.firewall revisited
Message-ID:  <199912032006.NAA12109@mt.sri.com>
In-Reply-To: <384812A7.EAAB3BD8@algroup.co.uk>
References:  <199912021954.LAA74271@gndrsh.dnsmgr.net> <3846FA12.F1480F19@algroup.co.uk> <199912022343.QAA08462@mt.sri.com> <3847ACBE.3D66A556@algroup.co.uk> <3847C0CB.2E9774A@algroup.co.uk> <199912031601.JAA10973@mt.sri.com> <3847F55E.B546B2EB@algroup.co.uk> <199912031658.JAA11193@mt.sri.com> <3847F939.47978597@algroup.co.uk> <199912031729.KAA11375@mt.sri.com> <384812A7.EAAB3BD8@algroup.co.uk>

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> > > This works, believe me. I've done it. I can squirt data into a
> > > "protected" syslog on port 514, which shouldn't be possible. Using my
> > > rules, this is no longer possible.
> > 
> > What I'm hearing you state is never trust anything outside your
> > firewall, which is a great rule, but not one that I believe you can rely
> > on.  Sooner or later you must depend on *something* external (other DNS
> > servers, etc...), but you can tighten them down.
> 
> Ok, well we're making some progress then... you're almost hearing what
> I'm trying to say... :)

The problem here is that you're assuming a particular kind of setup that we're
not assuming.  You're assuming that the box is a standalone system, and
we're not assuming that.  The thing we're assuming is that this box is a
firewall, which I don't believe you are assuming.

From that, I think we can agree that attempting to build any sort of
generic ruleset that fits every situation is impossible to do.

> > 1) Drop anything that claims to be you coming from the outside.
> > 2) Drop RFC 1918 unroutable traffic (incoming/outgoing)
> > 3) Don't allow packets with a multicast source address (in/out).
> > 4) Drop anything that isn't using an internal network address from going out.
> > 5) Don't allow broadcast traffic in/out
> > 
> > [ At this point, the traffic is mostly 'sanitized'.  You know that
> > whatever is coming and going is 'legitimate'.  The outside stuff is not
> > to be trusted.
> 
> When I dial into the net from my notebook, there is only an outside.
> No-one is 'sanitised'.

Again, you're making an assumption about a particular setup.  That
assumption isn't any more/less valid than our assumptions, so we end up
with a non-generic solution.

> Anyway, can we get back to the matter in hand...?

This *is* the matter at hand.  You're making a solution for your
situation, which is not necessarily appropriate for my situation, or for
Rod's situation.

The problem is that there is no generic solution.


Nate


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