From owner-svn-ports-all@freebsd.org Wed Aug 1 16:33:00 2018 Return-Path: Delivered-To: svn-ports-all@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:606c::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9EDE11062A57; Wed, 1 Aug 2018 16:33:00 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from adamw@FreeBSD.org) Received: from mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org (mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:606c::19:3]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (Client CN "mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org", Issuer "Let's Encrypt Authority X3" (verified OK)) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 544957C2C3; Wed, 1 Aug 2018 16:33:00 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from adamw@FreeBSD.org) Received: from repo.freebsd.org (repo.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:6068::e6a:0]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate) by mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1AF8525017; Wed, 1 Aug 2018 16:33:00 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from adamw@FreeBSD.org) Received: from repo.freebsd.org ([127.0.1.37]) by repo.freebsd.org (8.15.2/8.15.2) with ESMTP id w71GWx9P054608; Wed, 1 Aug 2018 16:32:59 GMT (envelope-from adamw@FreeBSD.org) Received: (from adamw@localhost) by repo.freebsd.org (8.15.2/8.15.2/Submit) id w71GWwft054607; Wed, 1 Aug 2018 16:32:58 GMT (envelope-from adamw@FreeBSD.org) Message-Id: <201808011632.w71GWwft054607@repo.freebsd.org> X-Authentication-Warning: repo.freebsd.org: adamw set sender to adamw@FreeBSD.org using -f From: Adam Weinberger Date: Wed, 1 Aug 2018 16:32:58 +0000 (UTC) To: ports-committers@freebsd.org, svn-ports-all@freebsd.org, svn-ports-head@freebsd.org Subject: svn commit: r476183 - head/security/vuxml X-SVN-Group: ports-head X-SVN-Commit-Author: adamw X-SVN-Commit-Paths: head/security/vuxml X-SVN-Commit-Revision: 476183 X-SVN-Commit-Repository: ports MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-BeenThere: svn-ports-all@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.27 Precedence: list List-Id: SVN commit messages for the ports tree List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 01 Aug 2018 16:33:00 -0000 Author: adamw Date: Wed Aug 1 16:32:58 2018 New Revision: 476183 URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/ports/476183 Log: Fix a common grammar error: "can not" means the opposite of "cannot." "Can not" means "it is possible not to," and "cannot" means "it is impossible to." Modified: head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml Modified: head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml ============================================================================== --- head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml Wed Aug 1 14:20:32 2018 (r476182) +++ head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml Wed Aug 1 16:32:58 2018 (r476183) @@ -68619,7 +68619,7 @@ affected..

driver to dereference an invalid pointer.

Although this has not been confirmed, the possibility that an attacker may be able to execute arbitrary code in kernel - context can not be ruled out.

+ context cannot be ruled out.

@@ -79852,7 +79852,7 @@ executed in your Internet Explorer while displaying th

Problem description:

There is a programming error in the DES implementation used in crypt() - when handling input which contains characters that can not be represented + when handling input which contains characters that cannot be represented with 7-bit ASCII.

When the input contains characters with only the most significant bit set (0x80), that character and all characters after it will be ignored.

@@ -89842,7 +89842,7 @@ executed in your Internet Explorer while displaying th being too small, allowing it to be overwritten. The impact of this programming error is that MaraDNS can be crashed by sending MaraDNS a single "packet of death". Since the data placed in the - overwritten array can not be remotely controlled (it is a list of + overwritten array cannot be remotely controlled (it is a list of increasing integers), there is no way to increase privileges exploiting this bug.

@@ -115625,7 +115625,7 @@ executed in your Internet Explorer while displaying th RealMedia RTSP streams. When checking for matching asm rules, the code stores the results in a fixed-size array, but no boundary checks are performed. This may lead to a buffer overflow if the user is tricked - into connecting to a malicious server. Since the attacker can not write + into connecting to a malicious server. Since the attacker cannot write arbitrary data into the buffer, creating an exploit is very hard; but a DoS attack is easily made. A fix for this problem was committed to SVN on Sun Dec 31 13:27:53 2006