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Date:      Wed, 15 Jan 2014 11:25:15 -0800
From:      Xin Li <delphij@delphij.net>
To:        Darren Pilgrim <list_freebsd@bluerosetech.com>, freebsd-stable@freebsd.org
Subject:   Re: [FreeBSD-Announce] FreeBSD Errata Notice FreeBSD-EN-14:01.random
Message-ID:  <52D6E09B.4000506@delphij.net>
In-Reply-To: <52D6BF9C.8070405@bluerosetech.com>
References:  <201401142011.s0EKBoi7082738@freefall.freebsd.org> <52D6BF9C.8070405@bluerosetech.com>

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On 01/15/14 09:04, Darren Pilgrim wrote:
> On 1/14/2014 12:11 PM, FreeBSD Errata Notices wrote:
>> III. Impact
>> 
>> Someone who has control over these hardware RNGs would be able
>> to predicate the output from random(4) and urandom(4) devices and
>> may be able to reveal unique keys that are used to encrypt data.
> 
> This is good to know, but I have to wonder:
> 
> If the attacker has that level of access to the hardware, I would
> expect one of two things is also true:
> 
> 1. If you're on "bare metal", the attacker has firmware-level or 
> physical access to the machine; 2. If you're on a hypervisor, you
> can't trust the hypervisor;
> 
> In both cases, I would think the attacker can use much simpler,
> more direct vectors and you have much worse things to worry about
> than the quality of /dev/random.  I'm not questioning the validity
> of the advisory, I'm genuinely curious about this.  I can't think
> of a scenario were someone could attack /dev/random using this
> vector without 1 or 2 above also being true.

Not necessarily.

An attacker may plant a (well, technically) trapdoor which weaken the
keys but not to the extent to expose a easy-to-find issue by
manipulating the random number generator.

At a later time, the attacker may be able to use this advantage to do
bad things, like it may take very limited time or resource to decrypt
data from the victim system, *without* having any direct access to the
system.

Cheers,
- -- 
Xin LI <delphij@delphij.net>    https://www.delphij.net/
FreeBSD - The Power to Serve!           Live free or die
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