From owner-svn-ports-all@freebsd.org Sat Sep 14 21:17:27 2019 Return-Path: Delivered-To: svn-ports-all@mailman.nyi.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:606c::19:1]) by mailman.nyi.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4694FFF889; Sat, 14 Sep 2019 21:17:27 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from sunpoet@FreeBSD.org) Received: from mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org (mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:606c::19:3]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) client-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) client-digest SHA256) (Client CN "mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org", Issuer "Let's Encrypt Authority X3" (verified OK)) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 46W51g1967z4VkW; Sat, 14 Sep 2019 21:17:27 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from sunpoet@FreeBSD.org) Received: from repo.freebsd.org (repo.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:6068::e6a:0]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate) by mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0C1CE25BF6; Sat, 14 Sep 2019 21:17:27 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from sunpoet@FreeBSD.org) Received: from repo.freebsd.org ([127.0.1.37]) by repo.freebsd.org (8.15.2/8.15.2) with ESMTP id x8ELHQ4B017212; Sat, 14 Sep 2019 21:17:26 GMT (envelope-from sunpoet@FreeBSD.org) Received: (from sunpoet@localhost) by repo.freebsd.org (8.15.2/8.15.2/Submit) id x8ELHQZN017211; Sat, 14 Sep 2019 21:17:26 GMT (envelope-from sunpoet@FreeBSD.org) Message-Id: <201909142117.x8ELHQZN017211@repo.freebsd.org> X-Authentication-Warning: repo.freebsd.org: sunpoet set sender to sunpoet@FreeBSD.org using -f From: Sunpoet Po-Chuan Hsieh Date: Sat, 14 Sep 2019 21:17:26 +0000 (UTC) To: ports-committers@freebsd.org, svn-ports-all@freebsd.org, svn-ports-head@freebsd.org Subject: svn commit: r512076 - head/security/vuxml X-SVN-Group: ports-head X-SVN-Commit-Author: sunpoet X-SVN-Commit-Paths: head/security/vuxml X-SVN-Commit-Revision: 512076 X-SVN-Commit-Repository: ports MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-BeenThere: svn-ports-all@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: SVN commit messages for the ports tree List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 14 Sep 2019 21:17:27 -0000 Author: sunpoet Date: Sat Sep 14 21:17:26 2019 New Revision: 512076 URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/ports/512076 Log: Document curl vulnerability Modified: head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml Modified: head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml ============================================================================== --- head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml Sat Sep 14 21:17:13 2019 (r512075) +++ head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml Sat Sep 14 21:17:26 2019 (r512076) @@ -58,6 +58,67 @@ Notes: * Do not forget port variants (linux-f10-libxml2, libxml2, etc.) --> + + curl -- multiple vulnerabilities + + + curl + 7.19.47.66.0 + + + + +

curl security problems:

+
CVE-2019-5481: FTP-KRB double-free
+
libcurl can be told to use kerberos over FTP to a server, as set with + the CURLOPT_KRBLEVEL option.
+
During such kerberos FTP data transfer, the server sends data to curl + in blocks with the 32 bit size of each block first and then that amount + of data immediately following.
+
A malicious or just broken server can claim to send a very large block + and if by doing that it makes curl's subsequent call to realloc() to + fail, curl would then misbehave in the exit path and double-free the + memory.
+
In practical terms, an up to 4 GB memory area may very well be fine to + allocate on a modern 64 bit system but on 32 bit systems it will fail.
+
Kerberos FTP is a rarely used protocol with curl. Also, Kerberos + authentication is usually only attempted and used with servers that the + client has a previous association with.
+
CVE-2019-5482: TFTP small blocksize heap buffer overflow
+
libcurl contains a heap buffer overflow in the function + (tftp_receive_packet()) that receives data from a TFTP server. It can + call recvfrom() with the default size for the buffer rather than with + the size that was used to allocate it. Thus, the content that might + overwrite the heap memory is controlled by the server.
+
This flaw is only triggered if the TFTP server sends an OACK without + the BLKSIZE option, when a BLKSIZE smaller than 512 bytes was requested + by the TFTP client. OACK is a TFTP extension and is not used by all + TFTP servers.
+
Users choosing a smaller block size than default should be rare as the + primary use case for changing the size is to make it larger.
+
It is rare for users to use TFTP across the Internet. It is most + commonly used within local networks. TFTP as a protocol is always + inherently insecure.
+
This issue was introduced by the add of the TFTP BLKSIZE option + handling. It was previously incompletely fixed by an almost identical + issue called CVE-2019-5436.
+

+ + + + https://curl.haxx.se/docs/security.html + https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2019-5481.html + https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2019-5482.html + CVE-2019-5481 + CVE-2019-5482 + + + 2019-09-11 + 2019-09-14 + + + OpenSSL -- Multiple vulnerabilities