Date: Tue, 19 Apr 2016 00:38:24 +0000 (UTC) From: Jason Unovitch <junovitch@FreeBSD.org> To: ports-committers@freebsd.org, svn-ports-all@freebsd.org, svn-ports-branches@freebsd.org Subject: svn commit: r413618 - in branches/2016Q2/security/wpa_supplicant: . files Message-ID: <201604190038.u3J0cOMO074713@repo.freebsd.org>
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Author: junovitch Date: Tue Apr 19 00:38:24 2016 New Revision: 413618 URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/ports/413618 Log: MFH: r413609 security/wpa_supplicant: patch 3 CVE security advisories These patches were developed upstream and published as a response to the security advisories. PR: 208482 Security: CVE-2015-5310 Security: CVE-2015-5315 Security: CVE-2015-5316 Security: https://vuxml.FreeBSD.org/freebsd/976567f6-05c5-11e6-94fa-002590263bf5.html Approved by: ports-secteam (with hat) Added: branches/2016Q2/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-6-backported-WNM-Ignore-Key-Data-in-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-frame - copied unchanged from r413609, head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-6-backported-WNM-Ignore-Key-Data-in-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-frame branches/2016Q2/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-7-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation - copied unchanged from r413609, head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-7-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation branches/2016Q2/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-7-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation - copied unchanged from r413609, head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-7-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation branches/2016Q2/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-8-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-error-path-for-unexpected-Confirm-m - copied unchanged from r413609, head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-8-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-error-path-for-unexpected-Confirm-m Modified: branches/2016Q2/security/wpa_supplicant/Makefile Directory Properties: branches/2016Q2/ (props changed) Modified: branches/2016Q2/security/wpa_supplicant/Makefile ============================================================================== --- branches/2016Q2/security/wpa_supplicant/Makefile Tue Apr 19 00:36:17 2016 (r413617) +++ branches/2016Q2/security/wpa_supplicant/Makefile Tue Apr 19 00:38:24 2016 (r413618) @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ PORTNAME= wpa_supplicant PORTVERSION= 2.5 +PORTREVISION= 1 CATEGORIES= security net MASTER_SITES= http://w1.fi/releases/ Copied: branches/2016Q2/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-6-backported-WNM-Ignore-Key-Data-in-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-frame (from r413609, head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-6-backported-WNM-Ignore-Key-Data-in-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-frame) ============================================================================== --- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added) +++ branches/2016Q2/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-6-backported-WNM-Ignore-Key-Data-in-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-frame Tue Apr 19 00:38:24 2016 (r413618, copy of r413609, head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-6-backported-WNM-Ignore-Key-Data-in-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-frame) @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +From 6b12d93d2c7428a34bfd4b3813ba339ed57b698a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Sun, 25 Oct 2015 15:45:50 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] WNM: Ignore Key Data in WNM Sleep Mode Response frame if no + PMF in use + +WNM Sleep Mode Response frame is used to update GTK/IGTK only if PMF is +enabled. Verify that PMF is in use before using this field on station +side to avoid accepting unauthenticated key updates. (CVE-2015-5310) + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +--- + wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c | 6 ++++++ + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) + +--- wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c ++++ wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c +@@ -187,6 +187,12 @@ static void wnm_sleep_mode_exit_success(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, + end = ptr + key_len_total; + wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: Key Data", ptr, key_len_total); + ++ if (key_len_total && !wpa_sm_pmf_enabled(wpa_s->wpa)) { ++ wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_INFO, ++ "WNM: Ignore Key Data in WNM-Sleep Mode Response - PMF not enabled"); ++ return; ++ } ++ + while (ptr + 1 < end) { + if (ptr + 2 + ptr[1] > end) { + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: Invalid Key Data element " Copied: branches/2016Q2/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-7-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation (from r413609, head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-7-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation) ============================================================================== --- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added) +++ branches/2016Q2/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-7-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation Tue Apr 19 00:38:24 2016 (r413618, copy of r413609, head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-7-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation) @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +From 8057821706784608b828e769ccefbced95591e50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 18:18:17 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd peer: Fix last fragment length validation + +All but the last fragment had their length checked against the remaining +room in the reassembly buffer. This allowed a suitably constructed last +fragment frame to try to add extra data that would go beyond the buffer. +The length validation code in wpabuf_put_data() prevents an actual +buffer write overflow from occurring, but this results in process +termination. (CVE-2015-5315) + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +--- + src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 7 +++---- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +--- src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c ++++ src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c +@@ -903,7 +903,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret, + /* + * buffer and ACK the fragment + */ +- if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) { ++ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) { + data->in_frag_pos += len; + if (data->in_frag_pos > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) { + wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow attack " +@@ -916,7 +916,8 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret, + return NULL; + } + wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len); +- ++ } ++ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) { + resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD, + EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE, + EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, eap_get_id(reqData)); +@@ -930,10 +931,8 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret, + * we're buffering and this is the last fragment + */ + if (data->in_frag_pos) { +- wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len); + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes", + (int) len); +- data->in_frag_pos += len; + pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf); + len = data->in_frag_pos; + } +-- +1.9.1 + Copied: branches/2016Q2/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-7-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation (from r413609, head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-7-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation) ============================================================================== --- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added) +++ branches/2016Q2/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-7-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation Tue Apr 19 00:38:24 2016 (r413618, copy of r413609, head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-7-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation) @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +From bef802ece03f9ae9d52a21f0cf4f1bc2c5a1f8aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 18:24:16 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd server: Fix last fragment length validation + +All but the last fragment had their length checked against the remaining +room in the reassembly buffer. This allowed a suitably constructed last +fragment frame to try to add extra data that would go beyond the buffer. +The length validation code in wpabuf_put_data() prevents an actual +buffer write overflow from occurring, but this results in process +termination. (CVE-2015-5314) + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +--- + src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 6 +++--- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +--- src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c ++++ src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c +@@ -970,7 +970,7 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, + /* + * the first and all intermediate fragments have the M bit set + */ +- if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) { ++ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) { + if ((data->in_frag_pos + len) > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) { + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow " + "attack detected! (%d+%d > %d)", +@@ -981,6 +981,8 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, + } + wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len); + data->in_frag_pos += len; ++ } ++ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) { + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Got a %d byte fragment", + (int) len); + return; +@@ -990,8 +992,6 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, + * buffering fragments so that's how we know it's the last) + */ + if (data->in_frag_pos) { +- wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len); +- data->in_frag_pos += len; + pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf); + len = data->in_frag_pos; + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes", +-- +1.9.1 + Copied: branches/2016Q2/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-8-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-error-path-for-unexpected-Confirm-m (from r413609, head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-8-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-error-path-for-unexpected-Confirm-m) ============================================================================== --- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added) +++ branches/2016Q2/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-8-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-error-path-for-unexpected-Confirm-m Tue Apr 19 00:38:24 2016 (r413618, copy of r413609, head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-8-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-error-path-for-unexpected-Confirm-m) @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +From 95577884ca4fa76be91344ff7a8d5d1e6dc3da61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 19:35:44 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd peer: Fix error path for unexpected Confirm message + +If the Confirm message is received from the server before the Identity +exchange has been completed, the group has not yet been determined and +data->grp is NULL. The error path in eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange() +did not take this corner case into account and could end up +dereferencing a NULL pointer and terminating the process if invalid +message sequence is received. (CVE-2015-5316) + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +--- + src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 3 ++- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c ++++ src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c +@@ -774,7 +774,8 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data, + wpabuf_put_data(data->outbuf, conf, SHA256_MAC_LEN); + + fin: +- bin_clear_free(cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime)); ++ if (data->grp) ++ bin_clear_free(cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime)); + BN_clear_free(x); + BN_clear_free(y); + if (data->outbuf == NULL) { +-- +1.9.1 +
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