From owner-freebsd-questions@FreeBSD.ORG Tue Mar 9 08:30:56 2010 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-questions@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:4f8:fff6::34]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 227C3106564A for ; Tue, 9 Mar 2010 08:30:56 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from perryh@pluto.rain.com) Received: from agora.rdrop.com (agora.rdrop.com [199.26.172.34]) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F394F8FC15 for ; Tue, 9 Mar 2010 08:30:55 +0000 (UTC) Received: from agora.rdrop.com (66@localhost [127.0.0.1]) by agora.rdrop.com (8.13.1/8.12.7) with ESMTP id o298UjQN096344 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NOT); Tue, 9 Mar 2010 00:30:45 -0800 (PST) (envelope-from perryh@pluto.rain.com) Received: (from uucp@localhost) by agora.rdrop.com (8.13.1/8.12.9/Submit) with UUCP id o298Ujxw096343; Tue, 9 Mar 2010 00:30:45 -0800 (PST) Received: from fbsd61 by pluto.rain.com (4.1/SMI-4.1-pluto-M2060407) id AA13631; Tue, 9 Mar 10 00:25:54 PST Date: Tue, 09 Mar 2010 00:31:03 -0800 From: perryh@pluto.rain.com To: lalev.angelin@gmail.com Message-Id: <4b960747.T7FO5AkwXJGAGApg%perryh@pluto.rain.com> References: <532b03711003071325j9ab3c98u703b31abdc7ea8fe@mail.gmail.com> In-Reply-To: <532b03711003071325j9ab3c98u703b31abdc7ea8fe@mail.gmail.com> User-Agent: nail 11.25 7/29/05 Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Cc: freebsd-questions@freebsd.org Subject: Re: [OT] ssh security X-BeenThere: freebsd-questions@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.5 Precedence: list List-Id: User questions List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 09 Mar 2010 08:30:56 -0000 Angelin Lalev wrote: > So, SSH uses algorithms like ssh-dss or ssh-rsa to do key exchange. > These algorithms can defeat any attempts on eavesdropping, but cannot > defeat man-in-the-middle attacks. To defeat them, some pre-shared > information is needed - key fingerprint. What happened to Diffie-Hellman? Last I heard, its whole point was to enable secure communication, protected from both eavesdropping and MIM attacks, between systems having no prior trust relationship (e.g. any sort of pre-shared secret). What stops the server and client from establishing a Diffie-Hellman session and using it to perform the key exchange?