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From: Ben Black <black@gage.com>
Date: Mon, 17 Feb 97 15:41:56 -0600
To: Jim Shankland <jas@flyingfox.COM>
Subject: Re: blowfish passwords in FreeBSD
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>It is, of course, always possible to guess the right password the
>very first time, thereby cracking the account in well under a second.

or guessing it in the first few million tries, thereby cracking the account  
in 3 hours.

>This will work even on an old 386 box lying around your lab, and
>does not require a card with ASICs.  All you need is very good luck :-).
>Whether this says anything meaningful about the cryptographic
>strength of DES is debatable.

the cryptographic strength of DES is already debatable.  the differential  
cryptanalysis of DES by shamir was met by certain folks involved in the  
creation of the lucifer and DES ciphers with the statement that they knew  
about differential cryptanalysis of DES 20 years ago.

i am also of the mind that NSA doesn't allow the export of any encryption it  
can't break.


b3n