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Date:      Sat, 22 Jul 2000 10:49:30 -0700 (PDT)
From:      "Rodney W. Grimes" <freebsd@gndrsh.dnsmgr.net>
To:        kris@FreeBSD.ORG (Kris Kennaway)
Cc:        mark@grondar.za (Mark Murray), jeroen@vangelderen.org (Jeroen C. van Gelderen), current@FreeBSD.ORG
Subject:   Re: randomdev entropy gathering is really weak
Message-ID:  <200007221749.KAA43756@gndrsh.dnsmgr.net>
In-Reply-To: <Pine.BSF.4.21.0007211849570.68809-100000@freefall.freebsd.org> from Kris Kennaway at "Jul 21, 2000 06:54:54 pm"

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> On Fri, 21 Jul 2000, Mark Murray wrote:
> 
> > Section 2.1, last paragraph:
> > "If a system is shut down, and restarted, it is desirable to store some
> > high-entropy data (such as the key) in non-volatile memory. This allows
> > the PRNG to be restarted in an unguessable state at the next restart. We
> > call this data the reseed file."
> 
> I'm all for storing a sample at shutdown and using it to help seed the
> PRNG at startup, but it shouldn't be the only seed used (for example, the
> case where the system has never been shut down (cleanly) before and so has
> no pre-existing seed file is a BIG corner case to consider since thats how
> the system is at the time it first generates SSH keys after a fresh
> install).
> 
> It might be only an academic vulnerability, but if someone can read your
> HD during the time the system is shut down then I'd prefer them not to
> know the precise state when the system next starts up again. Yes, if they
> can read they can probably also write, but it seems like a mistake when
> there's nothing really gained by saving the complete state, as opposed to
> an extract.

And for folks like us who do mass installs via dd if=/dev/da1 of=/dev/da2,
where da1 is a mastered image created via ``make installworld DESTDIR=/mnt'',
the corner case is very large.  I have been bitten by an event where the
master disk was booted once before replication, and thus all systems
had _IDENTICAL_ /etc/ssh contents.  Not a very good idea !!

We have amended the manufacturing process now, so that part of the
disk replication is the nuking and regeneration of /etc/ssh.


-- 
Rod Grimes - KD7CAX @ CN85sl - (RWG25)               rgrimes@gndrsh.dnsmgr.net


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