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Date:      Wed, 30 Jun 2004 07:52:22 -0500
From:      Kevin Lyons <kevin_lyons@ofdengineering.com>
To:        Christian Weisgerber <naddy@mips.inka.de>
Cc:        freebsd-chat@freebsd.org
Subject:   Re: "TrustedBSD" addons
Message-ID:  <40E2B786.8030005@ofdengineering.com>
In-Reply-To: <cbt15e$20hq$1@kemoauc.mips.inka.de>
References:  <40E1A6C0.2040406@ofdengineering.com> <cbt15e$20hq$1@kemoauc.mips.inka.de>

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Christian Weisgerber wrote:

> Kevin Lyons <kevin_lyons@ofdengineering.com> wrote:
> 
> 
>>Is this the right way to go?  We're adding more bloat while openbsd is 
>>cleaning itself and reworking kernal memory allocation to make exploits 
> 
>                       ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> 
>>near impossible.
> 
>   ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> 
> Er, what?

Er, read the following (from http://www.openbsd.org/security.html). I 
believe they've been doing the random malloc/mmap since 3.4. Almost a 
year ago.

1) "As we audit source code, we often invent new ways of solving 
problems. Sometimes these ideas have been used before in some random 
application written somewhere, but perhaps not taken to the degree that 
we do.

     * strlcpy() and strlcat()
     * Memory protection purify
           o W^X
           o .rodata segment
           o Guard pages
           o Randomized malloc()
           o Randomized mmap()
           o atexit() and stdio protection
     * Privilege seperation
     * Privilege revocation
     * Chroot jailing
     * New uids
     * ProPolice
     * ... and others "

2) If that is not clear enough... from 
http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,3959,1111894,00.asp

OpenBSD 3.3 adds page-level memory permissions (on SPARC, Alpha and 
PA-RISC CPUs) that mark each memory page as either writable or 
executable (but not both at once), to make it harder for an attacker to 
write attack code into a memory location and execute it.

Unfortunately, this feature isn't provided on x86 or PowerPC chips yet, 
although it's planned for the OpenBSD 3.4 release.

The OpenBSD project has made a decision against 
trusted-operating-system-style mandatory access controls that place 
kernel-enforced limits on what particular processes or users can do. 
"People who use such things build systems which cannot be administered 
later," said Theo de Raadt, OpenBSD project leader, in Calgary, Alberta. 
"I am holding the fort against such complexity."


-- 
Kevin Lyons
OFD Engineering, 950 Threadneedle Suite 250, Houston Texas 77079
Phone: 281-679-9060, ext. 118, E-mail: kevin_lyons@ofdengineering.com




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