From owner-freebsd-hackers@FreeBSD.ORG Sat Feb 23 18:05:45 2008 Return-Path: Delivered-To: hackers@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:4f8:fff6::34]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 342FD16A404 for ; Sat, 23 Feb 2008 18:05:45 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from atom@smasher.org) Received: from atom.smasher.org (atom.smasher.org [69.55.237.145]) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with SMTP id 117F713C45E for ; Sat, 23 Feb 2008 18:05:44 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from atom@smasher.org) Received: (qmail 7248 invoked by uid 1000); 23 Feb 2008 01:08:56 -0000 Message-ID: <20080223010856.7244.qmail@smasher.org> Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII; format=flowed Date: Sat, 23 Feb 2008 14:08:54 +1300 (NZDT) From: Atom Smasher MIME-Version: 1.0 OpenPGP: id=0xB88D52E4D9F57808; algo=1 (RSA); size=4096; url=http://atom.smasher.org/pgp.txt To: hackers@freebsd.org X-POM: The Moon is Waning Gibbous (97% of Full) X-Hashcash: 1:20:0802230108:hackers@freebsd.org::RawPPWZJKxSabc+3:00000000000000 0000000000000000000000000JvY X-Hashcash: 1:20:0802230108:pjd@freebsd.org::HKWc1XAKoJNbBSQY:000000000000000000 0000000000000000000000000CFh Cc: Pawel Jakub Dawidek Subject: Security Flaw in Popular Disk Encryption Technologies X-BeenThere: freebsd-hackers@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.5 Precedence: list List-Id: Technical Discussions relating to FreeBSD List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 23 Feb 2008 18:05:45 -0000 article below. does anyone know how this affects eli/geli? from the geli man page: "detach - Detach the given providers, which means remove the devfs entry and clear the keys from memory." does that mean that geli properly wipes keys from RAM when a laptop is turned off? -- ...atom ________________________ http://atom.smasher.org/ 762A 3B98 A3C3 96C9 C6B7 582A B88D 52E4 D9F5 7808 ------------------------------------------------- "The difference between common-sense and paranoia is that common-sense is thinking everyone is out to get you. That's normal -- they are. Paranoia is thinking that they're conspiring." -- J. Kegler ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Organization: EFF Date: Fri, 22 Feb 2008 13:08:00 -0600 (CST) From: EFFector list Subject: EFFector 21.06: Open Source Advocate, Canadian Copyfighter, and AT&T Whistleblower Win Pioneer Awards * Research Team Finds Security Flaw in Popular Disk Encryption Technologies Laptops in "Sleep" or "Hibernation" Mode Most Vulnerable to Attack San Francisco - A team including the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Princeton University, and other researchers have found a major security flaw in several popular disk encryption technologies that leaves encrypted data vulnerable to attack and exposure. "People trust encryption to protect sensitive data when their computer is out of their immediate control," said EFF Staff Technologist Seth Schoen, a member of the research team. "But this new class of vulnerabilities shows it is not a sure thing. Whether your laptop is stolen, or you simply lose track of it for a few minutes at airport security, the information inside can still be read by a clever attacker." The researchers cracked several widely used disk encryption technologies, including Microsoft's BitLocker, Apple's FileVault, TrueCrypt, and dm-crypt. These "secure" disk encryption systems are supposed to protect sensitive information if a computer is stolen or otherwise accessed. However, in a paper and video published on the Internet today, the researchers show that data is vulnerable because encryption keys and passwords stored in a computer's temporary memory -- or RAM -- do not disappear immediately after losing power. "These types of attacks were often thought to be in the realm of the NSA," said Jacob Appelbaum, an independent computer security researcher and member of the research team. "But we discovered that on most computers, even without power applied for several seconds, data stored in RAM seemed to remain when power was reapplied. We then wrote programs to collect the contents of memory after the computers were rebooted." Laptops are particularly vulnerable to this attack, especially when they are turned on but locked, or in a "sleep" or "hibernation" mode entered when the laptop's cover is shut. Even though the machines require a password to unlock the screen, the encryption keys are already located in the RAM, which provides an opportunity for attackers with malicious intent. The research released today shows that these attacks are likely to be effective against many other disk encryption systems because these technologies have many architectural features in common. Servers with encrypted hard drives are also vulnerable. "We've broken disk encryption products in exactly the case when they seem to be most important these days: laptops that contain sensitive corporate data or personal information about business customers," said J. Alex Halderman, a Ph.D. candidate in Princeton's computer science department. "Unlike many security problems, this isn't a minor flaw; it is a fundamental limitation in the way these systems were designed." In addition to Schoen, Appelbaum, and Halderman, the research team included William Paul of Wind River Systems, and Princeton graduate students Nadia Heninger, William Clarkson, Joseph Calandrino, Ariel Feldman as well as Princeton Professor Edward Felten, the director of the Center for Information Technology Policy and a member of EFF's Board of Directors. The researchers have submitted the paper for publication and it is currently undergoing review. In the meantime, the researchers have contacted the developers of BitLocker, which is included in some versions of Windows Vista, Apple's FileVault, and the open source TrueCrypt and dm-crypt products, to make them aware of the vulnerability. One effective countermeasure is to turn a computer off entirely, though in some cases even this does not provide protection. For the full paper "Lest We Remember: Cold Boot Attacks on Encryption Keys," a demonstration video, and other background information: http://citp.princeton.edu/memory/ For this release: http://www.eff.org/press/archives/2008/02/21-0 ###