From owner-freebsd-stable Thu May 31 5:30:24 2001 Delivered-To: freebsd-stable@freebsd.org Received: from gs166.sp.cs.cmu.edu (GS166.SP.CS.CMU.EDU [128.2.205.169]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with SMTP id 6044537B422; Thu, 31 May 2001 05:30:20 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from dpelleg@gs166.sp.cs.cmu.edu) Date: Thu, 31 May 2001 08:30:09 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Cc: freebsd-stable@freebsd.org Subject: remounts (was: Re: adding "noschg" to ssh and friends) X-Mailer: VM 6.34 under 19.16 "Lille" XEmacs Lucid From: Dan Pelleg Reply-To: Dan Pelleg Message-Id: <20010531123020.6044537B422@hub.freebsd.org> Sender: owner-freebsd-stable@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk List-ID: List-Archive: (Web Archive) List-Help: (List Instructions) List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: X-Loop: FreeBSD.ORG "Karsten W. Rohrbach" wrote: > there are some real high-impact tweaks to be a little bit safer from > rootkits. one of them is mounting /tmp noexec. drawback: you got to > remount it exec for make installworld. I always wondered... Why are remounts permitted in all securelevels? I mean, in a locked-down system where it's acceptable to force a reboot in order to upgrade (or run a rootkit), I should be able to enforce read-only mounts. Currently anyone (well, root) can just mount -u -w them. Is this an implementation problem in mount(2)? (I haven't looked at the code). Or is this going to break things for people (amd? in high securelevels?). What am I missing? To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-stable" in the body of the message