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Date:      Sat, 16 Mar 2002 09:23:28 -0500 (EST)
From:      Robert Watson <rwatson@freebsd.org>
To:        Jeff Jirsa <jjirsa@hmc.edu>
Cc:        freebsd-hackers@freebsd.org, arr@freebsd.org
Subject:   Re: logging securelevel violations
Message-ID:  <Pine.NEB.3.96L.1020316091906.13304R-100000@fledge.watson.org>
In-Reply-To: <002001c1c936$c25ff4d0$5e3bad86@boredom>

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On Mon, 11 Mar 2002, Jeff Jirsa wrote:

> I've noticed that currently, violations of securelevel are aborted, but not
> typically logged. It seems like in addition to aborting whichever calls are
> in progress, logging an error might be beneficial. I recognize that this
> goes along the same lines as logging file permission errors, but if a file
> is marked immutable, the implicit value of the file should suggest that one
> might want to be able to audit attempted changes to that file.
<...>
> Would the following not work?
<...>
>         log(LOG_ERR, "Unable to load module %s: securelevel violation \n",
<...> 
> So, my questions are: Why shouldn't it be done? What simple problems am I
> overlooking? (Would such a contribution have a chance of making it into
> 5.0?)

It would work, certainly, but I guess the question is whether it's useful
and/or desirable.  The first concern I'd have is that the message is
inaccurate: it's not a violation, it's a denial of a request.  The
security policy hasn't been violated, it's actually been enforced.
Second, my concern would be whether this is useful.  First off,
securelevels are an inconsistent policy, and easy to work around as an
attacker without ever generating any of these warnings.  Second, these
warnings would be generated during normal operations, as a number of
applications attempt to load kernel modules when they need them, including
ppp.  Generating spurious warnings as part of normal system activity isn't
necessarily a useful activity, and tends to result in more calls for help
on questions@.

What would be far more desirable is a general framework for auditing,
something that Andrew Reiter <arr@FreeBSD.org> has been working on (CC'd). 
I'm not sure what his current status is, but presumably reporting
securelevel check failures would fit well into the framework.  Depending
on his progress, it may be that any contributions that you could make
towards bring the framework to fruition would be much appreciated :-), be
it requirements information, other suggestions, or code :-). 

Robert N M Watson             FreeBSD Core Team, TrustedBSD Project
robert@fledge.watson.org      NAI Labs, Safeport Network Services



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