From owner-svn-ports-head@freebsd.org Sun Sep 6 10:49:32 2020 Return-Path: Delivered-To: svn-ports-head@mailman.nyi.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:606c::19:1]) by mailman.nyi.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D24403CD8DD; Sun, 6 Sep 2020 10:49:32 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from tijl@FreeBSD.org) Received: from mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org (mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:606c::19:3]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) server-digest SHA256 client-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) client-digest SHA256) (Client CN "mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org", Issuer "Let's Encrypt Authority X3" (verified OK)) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4Bkp7w591yz3VW4; Sun, 6 Sep 2020 10:49:32 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from tijl@FreeBSD.org) Received: from repo.freebsd.org (repo.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:6068::e6a:0]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate) by mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9420BD3EF; Sun, 6 Sep 2020 10:49:32 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from tijl@FreeBSD.org) Received: from repo.freebsd.org ([127.0.1.37]) by repo.freebsd.org (8.15.2/8.15.2) with ESMTP id 086AnWKD002857; Sun, 6 Sep 2020 10:49:32 GMT (envelope-from tijl@FreeBSD.org) Received: (from tijl@localhost) by repo.freebsd.org (8.15.2/8.15.2/Submit) id 086AnWvg002856; Sun, 6 Sep 2020 10:49:32 GMT (envelope-from tijl@FreeBSD.org) Message-Id: <202009061049.086AnWvg002856@repo.freebsd.org> X-Authentication-Warning: repo.freebsd.org: tijl set sender to tijl@FreeBSD.org using -f From: Tijl Coosemans Date: Sun, 6 Sep 2020 10:49:32 +0000 (UTC) To: ports-committers@freebsd.org, svn-ports-all@freebsd.org, svn-ports-head@freebsd.org Subject: svn commit: r547782 - head/security/vuxml X-SVN-Group: ports-head X-SVN-Commit-Author: tijl X-SVN-Commit-Paths: head/security/vuxml X-SVN-Commit-Revision: 547782 X-SVN-Commit-Repository: ports MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-BeenThere: svn-ports-head@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.33 Precedence: list List-Id: SVN commit messages for the ports tree for head List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 06 Sep 2020 10:49:32 -0000 Author: tijl Date: Sun Sep 6 10:49:31 2020 New Revision: 547782 URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/ports/547782 Log: Document Mbed TLS 2020-09-1 and 2020-09-2. Security: https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-09-1 Security: https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-09-2 Modified: head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml Modified: head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml ============================================================================== --- head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml Sun Sep 6 10:25:41 2020 (r547781) +++ head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml Sun Sep 6 10:49:31 2020 (r547782) @@ -58,6 +58,73 @@ Notes: * Do not forget port variants (linux-f10-libxml2, libxml2, etc.) --> + + Mbed TLS -- Local side channel attack on RSA and static Diffie-Hellman + + + mbedtls + 2.16.8 + + + + +

Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard reports:

+
An attacker with access to precise enough timing and memory access + information (typically an untrusted operating system attacking a + secure enclave such as SGX or the TrustZone secure world) can + recover the private keys used in RSA or static (finite-field) + Diffie-Hellman operations.
+

+ + + + https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-09-2 + + + 2020-09-01 + 2020-09-06 + + + + + Mbed TLS -- Local side channel attack on classical CBC decryption in (D)TLS + + + mbedtls + 2.16.8 + + + + +

Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard reports:

+
When decrypting/authenticating (D)TLS record in a connection using + a CBC ciphersuite without the Encrypt-then-Mac extension RFC 7366, + Mbed TLS used dummy rounds of the compression function associated + with the hash used for HMAC in order to hide the length of the + padding to remote attackers, as recommended in the original Lucky + Thirteen paper.
+
A local attacker who is able to observe the state of the cache + could monitor the presence of mbedtls_md_process() in the cache in + order to determine when the actual computation ends and when the + dummy rounds start. This is a reliable target as it's always called + at least once, in response to a previous attack. The attacker can + then continue with one of many well-documented Lucky 13 + variants.
+

+ + + + https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-09-1 + CVE-2020-16150 + + + 2020-09-01 + 2020-09-06 + + + GnuTLS -- null pointer dereference