Skip site navigation (1)Skip section navigation (2)
Date:      Wed, 18 Feb 2015 07:45:38 -0800
From:      Nathan Whitehorn <nwhitehorn@freebsd.org>
To:        freebsd-ppc@freebsd.org
Subject:   Re: PowerMac G5 powerpc64: new context where repeatedly booting varies between failing and working
Message-ID:  <54E4B3A2.9020106@freebsd.org>
In-Reply-To: <836A3016-D41B-45CB-AD4B-946767212026@dsl-only.net>
References:  <7CA43EE3-8C11-4FBD-9F8A-42DF08B82362@dsl-only.net> <ABDD60F1-72C0-41E0-8DFB-4CFDCA9ACA82@dsl-only.net> <C355D814-D486-4644-B9C6-92992092FD55@dsl-only.net> <5FE82152-BBF7-4C6D-932D-AEE70546CACA@dsl-only.net> <36C14790-8E66-4C9D-9F29-A137FB49439D@dsl-only.net> <836A3016-D41B-45CB-AD4B-946767212026@dsl-only.net>

next in thread | previous in thread | raw e-mail | index | archive | help
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
--------------040607000109080202030001
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

Interesting. I'm assuming this is due to a bug in the 32-/64-bit ABI 
thunking that is required to call into Open Firmware. Could you see if 
the attached patch helps?
-Nathan

On 02/18/15 04:51, Mark Millard wrote:
> I modified openfirmware_core to check on the status of the pointer value between most of its stages. With this I've also seen later failures than the usual one, such as after a OF_finddevice use has its ofwcall return.
>
> And the change nails down the stage greatly for at what point it corrupts memory when it does fail...
>
> // OKAY HERE
>          result = ofwcall(args);
> // SOMETIMES CORRUPTED HERE
>
> Unfortunately to get this far ofwcall is my variant in order to, for example, enable recovery/retry from observed bad r1/r3 register problems that happened super-early on return from openfirmware in a high percentage of my boot attempts. I have yet to see how close to normal I can get ofwcall to be while still allowing this type of test.
>
>
> The relevant detection code in openfirmware_core is...
>
> /* HACK */
> extern void** authnone_create(void);
> ...
> static __inline void
> ofw_restore_trap_vec(char *restore_trap_vec)
> {
>          if (!ofw_real_mode)
>                  return;
>
>          bcopy(restore_trap_vec, (void *)EXC_RST, EXC_LAST - EXC_RST);
>          __syncicache(EXC_RSVD, EXC_LAST - EXC_RSVD);
> }
> ...
> static int
> openfirmware_core(void *args)
> {
>          int             result;
>          register_t      oldmsr;
>
> /* HACK */
> void** jnk1pp;
> void** jnk2pp;
> void* jnk = *authnone_create()
> if (jnk == *authnone_create()) jnk = *authnone_create();
>
>          /*
>           * Turn off exceptions - we really don't want to end up
>           * anywhere unexpected with PCPU set to something strange
>           * or the stack pointer wrong.
>           */
>          oldmsr = intr_disable();
>
> /* HACK */
> if (jnk == *authnone_create()) jnk = *authnone_create();
>
>          ofw_sprg_prepare();
>
> /* HACK */
> if (jnk == *authnone_create()) jnk = *authnone_create();
>
>          /* Save trap vectors */
>          ofw_save_trap_vec(save_trap_of);
>
> /* HACK */
> if (jnk == *authnone_create()) jnk = *authnone_create();
>   
>          /* Restore initially saved trap vectors */
>          ofw_restore_trap_vec(save_trap_init);
>
> /* HACK */
> jnk1pp = authnone_create();
>
> #if defined(AIM) && !defined(__powerpc64__)
>          /*
>           * Clear battable[] translations
>           */
>          if (!(cpu_features & PPC_FEATURE_64))
>                  __asm __volatile("mtdbatu 2, %0\n"
>                                   "mtdbatu 3, %0" : : "r" (0));
>          isync();
> #endif
>
>          result = ofwcall(args);
>
> /* HACK */
> jnk2pp = authnone_create();
>
>          /* Restore trap vecotrs */
>          ofw_restore_trap_vec(save_trap_of);
>
> /* HACK */
> if (jnk != *jnk1pp) jnk = *authnone_create();
> if (jnk != *jnk2pp) jnk = *authnone_create();
> /* Note: *jnk2pp above is what detects the bad pointer value when it goes bad */
> if (jnk == *authnone_create()) jnk = *authnone_create();
>
>          ofw_sprg_restore();
>
> /* HACK */
> if (jnk == *authnone_create()) jnk = *authnone_create();
>
>          intr_restore(oldmsr);
>
> /* HACK */
> if (jnk == *authnone_create()) jnk = *authnone_create();
>
>          return (result);
> }
>
> In the code this translates to...
>
> 00000000008a671c <.openfirmware_core+0x168> bl      00000000007a3de4 <.authnone_create>
> 00000000008a6720 <.openfirmware_core+0x16c> crmove  4*cr7+so,4*cr7+so
> 00000000008a6724 <.openfirmware_core+0x170> mr      r28,r3
>
> Note: The above loads r28 with a good address that later does not fail when later dereferenced (while FreeBSD's exception vectors are in place).
>
> 00000000008a6728 <.openfirmware_core+0x174> mr      r3,r29
> 00000000008a672c <.openfirmware_core+0x178> bl      00000000008ac930 <.ofwcall>
> 00000000008a6730 <.openfirmware_core+0x17c> crmove  4*cr7+so,4*cr7+so
> 00000000008a6734 <.openfirmware_core+0x180> mr      r26,r3
> 00000000008a6738 <.openfirmware_core+0x184> bl      00000000007a3de4 <.authnone_create>
> 00000000008a673c <.openfirmware_core+0x188> crmove  4*cr7+so,4*cr7+so
> 00000000008a6740 <.openfirmware_core+0x18c> mr      r29,r3
>
> Note: The above loads r29 with the bad address that is later detected by referencing it. This is the corrupted pointer value.
>
> 00000000008a6744 <.openfirmware_core+0x190> ld      r3,21216(r2)
> 00000000008a6748 <.openfirmware_core+0x194> lwz     r0,0(r3)
> 00000000008a674c <.openfirmware_core+0x198> cmpwi   cr7,r0,0
> 00000000008a6750 <.openfirmware_core+0x19c> beq+    cr7,00000000008a6778 <.openfirmware_core+0x1c4>
> 00000000008a6754 <.openfirmware_core+0x1a0> addi    r3,r3,16
> 00000000008a6758 <.openfirmware_core+0x1a4> li      r4,256
> 00000000008a675c <.openfirmware_core+0x1a8> li      r5,11776
> 00000000008a6760 <.openfirmware_core+0x1ac> bl      00000000008c158c <.bcopy>
> 00000000008a6764 <.openfirmware_core+0x1b0> crmove  4*cr7+so,4*cr7+so
> 00000000008a6768 <.openfirmware_core+0x1b4> li      r3,0
> 00000000008a676c <.openfirmware_core+0x1b8> li      r4,12032
> 00000000008a6770 <.openfirmware_core+0x1bc> bl      00000000008d5358 <.__syncicache>
>
> Note: At this point it is back to FreeBSD exception vectors so kernel debug display will work for bad pointer detection tests.
>
> 00000000008a6774 <.openfirmware_core+0x1c0> crmove  4*cr7+so,4*cr7+so
> 00000000008a6778 <.openfirmware_core+0x1c4> ld      r0,0(r28)
>
> Note: The above dereference of the before ofwcall pointer value (in r28) does not detect a bad pointer.
>
> 00000000008a677c <.openfirmware_core+0x1c8> cmpd    cr7,r0,r30
> 00000000008a6780 <.openfirmware_core+0x1cc> beq-    cr7,00000000008a6790 <.openfirmware_core+0x1dc>
> 00000000008a6784 <.openfirmware_core+0x1d0> bl      00000000007a3de4 <.authnone_create>
> 00000000008a6788 <.openfirmware_core+0x1d4> crmove  4*cr7+so,4*cr7+so
> 00000000008a678c <.openfirmware_core+0x1d8> ld      r30,0(r3)
> 00000000008a6790 <.openfirmware_core+0x1dc> ld      r0,0(r29)
>
> It is that last instruction (.openfirmware_core+0x1dc) that "detects" the bad pointer and leads to a kernel debugger display of some of the corrupted memory, including the stored pointer that the above code accessed and dereferenced to detect the problem.
>
> So the pointer was good just before the ofwcall and was bad just after it.
>
> ===
> Mark Millard
> markmi at dsl-only.net
>
> On 2015-Feb-17, at 09:34 PM, Mark Millard <markmi at dsl-only.net> wrote:
>
> [I had sent Nathan W. and Justin H. a picture of a display of a boot-time corrupted memory region. This time I tried to find the start and end of the region and I'm documenting in a textual form more appropriate to the list. I have also removed prior Email history from this Email but there is much context one must check that history for.]
>
> Several of the new values put in place by the .got memory corruption reported below match up with .opd or other types of addresses reported by objdump for my /boot/kernel10.1S/kernel. They are noted below as I list detailed differences.
>
> I made the early-boot-crash display a larger range and the span of the corruption seemed to go as follows for the corruption of part of the .got area. Also I induced a deference of the bad pointer as soon as it is discovered after the OF_peer(0) in question returns so later code would not be involved when it crashes. (Crash early, crash often...)
>
>
> Overall structure:
>
> 0xd2da37 and before as far as I looked: no corruption found.
>
> The area from 0xd2da38-0xd2dc9F: largely corrupted. 0x268 or 616 bytes or so in this corrupted range. 616=77*8.
>
> After that range: good again as far as I looked.
>
>
> The details:
>
> Warning: The below is based on hand transcribed information from screen pictures that I took.
>
> Showing pair of lines (good then corrupted), using x/x style lines:
>
> 0xd2da30: 0, b4fd2c, 0, b4fd70
> 0xd2da30: 0, b4fd2c, 0,      0
>
> 0xd2da40: 0,   e28948, 0, e1e460
> 0xd2da40: 0, 24000042, 0, d00058
> (24000042 looks like a cr value?)
> (0000000000d00058 l       .opd   0000000000000018 ofw_rendezvous_dispatch)
>
> 0xd2da50: 0, bc7de8,        0, bc7e08
> 0xd2da50: 0, cde110, c0000000,   8740
> (0xc000000000008740 looks like a stack address?)
> (0000000000cde110 g     F .opd   0000000000000018 smp_no_rendevous_barrier)
>
> 0xd2da60: 0, cd8470, 0, bd2608
> 0xd2da60: 0,      1, 0, c3a30c
> (0000000000c3a30c g       .data  0000000000000000 ofw_sprg0_save)
>
> 0xd2da70: 0,  bb5ea0, 0, b70870
> 0xd2da70: 0, 1c35ec0, 0,      0
>
> 0xd2da80: 0,   c49918, 0, bc7e18
> 0xd2da80: 0, 44000022, 0, de4b30
> (44000022 looks like a cr value?)
> (0000000000de4b30 g     O .bss   0000000000000460 thread0)
>
> 0xd2da90:         0, b720a0, 0,   b71370
> 0xd2da90: 900000000,   1032, 0, ff846d78
> (9000000000001032 looks like a SRR1 value.)
> (ff846d78 is openfirmware entry point?)
>
> 0xd2daa0: 0, bc7e30,         0,   bc7e58
> 0xd2daa0: 0, e39080, 100000000,   3030
> (0000000000e39080 g     O .bss   0000000000020000 __pcpu)
> (1000000000003030 looks like a SRR1 value?)
>
> 0xd2dab0:        0, bc7e80, 0, bc7eb0
> 0xd2dab0: c0000000,   83b0, 0, c3a280
> (0xc0000000000083b0 looks like a stack address?)
> (c3a280 is inside my PowerMac G5 specific hack's ofwstk area: c392a0 up to 0x3a2a0)
> (I've been gathering evidence about early-boot G5 crashes.)
>
> 0xd2dac0: 0, bc7ed0, 0, cf2960
> 0xd2dac0: 0, c40000, 0, c40000
>
> 0xd2dad0: 0, bc7f00, 0, bc7f28
> 0xd2dad0: 0, c40000, 0, c40000
>
> 0xd2dae0:        0, b72400, 0, bc7f28
> 0xd2dae0: c0000000,   8740, 0, cde110
> (0xc000000000008740 looks like a stack address?)
> (0000000000cde110 g     F .opd   0000000000000018 smp_no_rendevous_barrier)
>
> 0xd2daf0: 0, cf2b28, 0, b716a0
> 0xd2daf0: 0, d00058, 0, cde110
> (d00058 was also at 0xd2da4c and was followed by cde110 there.)
> (0000000000cde110 g     F .opd   0000000000000018 smp_no_rendevous_barrier)
>
> 0xd2db00: 0, cf2b88, 0, cf2b70
> 0xd2db00: 0, e6c280, 0,      0
> (e6c280 is inside the emergency_buffer.7752 area: e6c278 up to e6c378)
>
> 0xd2db10:         0, cf2b58,        0, 8480
> 0xd2db10: 900000000,   1032, c0000000, 8740
> (9000000000001032 looks like a SRR1 value?)
> (0xc000000000008740 looks like a stack address?)
>
> 0xd2db20: 0, c2d920, 0, cf2b10
> 0xd2db20: 0, c2d920, 0, cf2b10 (yep: unchanged!)
>
> 0xd2db30: 0,   b71718,        0, c49888
> 0xd2db30: 0, ff846734, 10000000,   3030
> (ff846734 would seem to be an openfirmware code address?)
> (1000000000003030 looks like a SRR1 value?)
>
> 0xd2db40: 0, c498a0, 0,   c54000
> 0xd2db40: 0, c498a0, 0, ff846d78
> (Yep: c498a0 was unchanged)
> (ff846d78 is openfirmware entry point?)
>
> 0xd2db50:        0, e313a8, 0, e31608
> 0xd2db50: 24000042, e313a8, 0,      0
> (24000042 looks like a cr value?)
> (Trying to store to address 0x2400004200e313a8 for a specific
> type of 10.1-STABLE build is how the problem was originally
> noticed.)
>
> 0xd2db60: 0, c31f80, 0, bc81e8
> 0xd2db60: 0, c31f80, 0,      0
> (Yep: 0x0000000000c31f80 is unchanged.)
>
> 0xd2db70:      0, e31408, 0, bc8228
> 0xd2db70: 200000, e31408, 0, bc8228
> (Yep: Only the 0x200000 was a change.)
>
> 0xd2db80: 0, c32488,        0, bc8238
> 0xd2db80: 0,      1, 10000000,   3030
> (1000000000003030 looks like a SRR1 value?)
>
> 0xd2db90: 0, e1e460, 0,   c31fc0
> 0xd2db90: 0,      0, 0, 7ff7e800
>
> 0xd2dba0: 0,   e31608, 0, bc8260
> 0xd2dba0: 0, 1000000a, 0, bc8260
> (Yep: 0x0000000000bc8260 unchanged.)
>
> 0xd2dbb0: 0, e1e460, 0, e1fa60
> 0xd2dbb0: 0, e1e460, 0, e1fa60 (yep: unchanged!)
>
> 0xd2dbc0:      0, bc8288,        0, c32488
> 0xd2dbc0: 111081,      0, fd3c2000,      0
> (fd3c2000 in openfirmware area?)
>
> 0xd2dbd0: 0, e3153c, 0, bc8298
> 0xd2dbd0: 10,     0, 0,      0
>
> Now a few unchanged: 0xd2de0-0xd2dc1F
>
> Then a change in the pattern of corruptions for the rest of the corrupted area:
>
> 0xd2dc20: 0, bc8288,       0, bc82e8
> 0xd2dc20: 0, bc8288, 127f500, bc82e8
>
> Note how bc8288 and bc82e8 did not change.
>  From here on those two columns are not
> corrupted but the other two are.
>
> 0xd2dc30:       0, bc8300,      0, c32488
> 0xd2dc30: 8000000, bc8300, e7d540, c32488
>
> 0xd2dc40:     0, b4fef0,       0, e31558
> 0xd2dc40: ecc40, b4fef0, 84eec80, e31558
>
> 0xd2dc50:       0, bc8308,       0, cf2f00
> 0xd2dc50: 1e85440, bc8308, 8766200, cf2f00
>
> 0xd2dc60:      0, bc8310,       0, bc8350
> 0xd2dc60: fb9040, bc8310, 93bb000, bc8350
>
> 0xd2dc70:       0, c32038,       0, de5718
> 0xd2dc70: 94f6b00, c32038, 8632600, de5718
>
> 0xd2dc80:       0, de7768,       0, bc3760
> 0xd2dc80: 1fc0f40, de7768, 10f4b40, bc3760
>
> 0xd2dc90:       0, de7768,      0, e1fa00
> 0xd2dc90: 99e5700, cfc658, 228740, e1fa00
>
> And after that things match for as far as I've looked: no corruptions.
>
>
>
>
>
> ===
> Mark Millard
> markmi at dsl-only.net
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> freebsd-ppc@freebsd.org mailing list
> http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-ppc
> To unsubscribe, send any mail to "freebsd-ppc-unsubscribe@freebsd.org"
>


--------------040607000109080202030001
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii;
 name="ofwcall.diff"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Disposition: attachment;
 filename="ofwcall.diff"

Index: ofwcall64.S
===================================================================
--- ofwcall64.S	(revision 278935)
+++ ofwcall64.S	(working copy)
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@
 
 	/* Get OF stack pointer */
 	ld	%r7,TOC_REF(ofwstk)(%r2)
-	addi	%r7,%r7,OFWSTKSZ-32
+	addi	%r7,%r7,OFWSTKSZ-64
 
 	/*
 	 * Set the MSR to the OF value. This has the side effect of disabling
@@ -126,9 +126,9 @@
 	 */
 	mr	%r5,%r1
 	mr	%r1,%r7
-	std	%r5,8(%r1)	/* Save real stack pointer */
-	std	%r2,16(%r1)	/* Save old TOC */
-	std	%r6,24(%r1)	/* Save old MSR */
+	std	%r5,40(%r1)	/* Save real stack pointer */
+	std	%r2,48(%r1)	/* Save old TOC */
+	std	%r6,56(%r1)	/* Save old MSR */
 	li	%r5,0
 	stw	%r5,4(%r1)
 	stw	%r5,0(%r1)
@@ -138,9 +138,9 @@
 	bctrl
 
 	/* Reload stack pointer and MSR from the OFW stack */
-	ld	%r6,24(%r1)
-	ld	%r2,16(%r1)
-	ld	%r1,8(%r1)
+	ld	%r6,56(%r1)
+	ld	%r2,48(%r1)
+	ld	%r1,40(%r1)
 
 	/* Now set the real MSR */
 	mtmsrd	%r6

--------------040607000109080202030001--



Want to link to this message? Use this URL: <https://mail-archive.FreeBSD.org/cgi/mid.cgi?54E4B3A2.9020106>