From owner-freebsd-security Mon May 3 8: 4: 3 1999 Delivered-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Received: from cc942873-a.ewndsr1.nj.home.com (cc942873-a.ewndsr1.nj.home.com [24.2.89.207]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 04BF914E0F for ; Mon, 3 May 1999 08:04:00 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from cjc@cc942873-a.ewndsr1.nj.home.com) Received: (from cjc@localhost) by cc942873-a.ewndsr1.nj.home.com (8.9.3/8.8.8) id LAA21305; Mon, 3 May 1999 11:03:55 -0400 (EDT) (envelope-from cjc) From: "Crist J. Clark" Message-Id: <199905031503.LAA21305@cc942873-a.ewndsr1.nj.home.com> Subject: Re: Blowfish/Twofish In-Reply-To: <9905030214.ZM6494@beatrice.rutgers.edu> from Allen Smith at "May 3, 99 02:14:40 am" To: easmith@beatrice.rutgers.edu (Allen Smith) Date: Mon, 3 May 1999 11:03:55 -0400 (EDT) Cc: peter.jeremy@auss2.alcatel.com.au, nick@shibumi.feralmonkey.org, freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Reply-To: cjclark@home.com X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4ME+ PL40 (25)] MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk X-Loop: FreeBSD.org Allen Smith wrote, > On May 3, 2:09am, Peter Jeremy (possibly) wrote: > > 0x1c wrote: > > >On a similar note, is there any restriction on one-way hashing algorithms? > > >I forget. > > AFAIK, there isn't. MD4, MD5, SHA-1 etc appear to be all be freely > > exportable. The export restrictions appear to be on crypto for > > `secrecy', whilst crypto for `authentication' is unrestricted. > > (This does suggest that some lessons in basic cryptography are > > needed around the US State Department). > > Actually, no... as long as you assume their basic motivation is to > limit _convenient_ cryptography. Remember the "cryptographic hooks" > nonsense? They're pretty obviously trying to make it as hard as > possible/practical for private citizens to use cryptography that the US > government can't break. I've always accepted the point of view from Press, Flannery, Teukolsky, and Vettering from _Numerical Recipes in C_ when they talk about DES, "A key controversial question is whether the NSA purposefully weakened the algorithm [DES], so that is had vulnerabilities significant enough to be exploited by NSA's own multi-billion dollar resources, but not so significant as to be exploitable by someone else. For our purposes we hardly need to know the answer to this: A random number generator whose deviations from randomness can be discerned only by concerted attack with resources comparable to NSA -- that random number generator should surely be contender for "World's Best" title." The moral of the story being, if the US governement, wants your data bad enough... they _are_ going to get it. Just as the government can only make it inconvenient for private citizens (in the US or foreign, the ones NSA is interested in) to use encryption; the private citizens (or again, NSA is most concerned with foreign governements) can really only make it inconvenient for the US governement to decrypt it. -- Crist J. Clark cjclark@home.com To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message