From owner-freebsd-security Mon Jan 29 12:35:43 2001 Delivered-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Received: by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix, from userid 758) id 6F88237B6A4; Mon, 29 Jan 2001 12:35:14 -0800 (PST) From: FreeBSD Security Advisories To: FreeBSD Security Advisories Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory: FreeBSD-SA-01:11.inetd Reply-To: security-advisories@freebsd.org Message-Id: <20010129203514.6F88237B6A4@hub.freebsd.org> Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2001 12:35:14 -0800 (PST) Sender: owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk X-Loop: FreeBSD.org -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-01:11 Security Advisory FreeBSD, Inc. Topic: inetd ident server allows remote users to partially read arbitrary wheel-accessible files Category: core Module: inetd Announced: 2001-01-29 Credits: Discovered during internal auditing Affects: FreeBSD 3.x (all releases) FreeBSD 4.x (all releases) Corrected: 2000-11-25 (FreeBSD 4.2-STABLE) 2001-01-26 (FreeBSD 3.5-STABLE) FreeBSD only: Yes I. Background The inetd ident server is an implementation of the RFC1413 identification server which returns the local username of the user connecting to a remote service. II. Problem Description During internal auditing, the internal ident server in inetd was found to incorrectly set group privileges according to the user. Due to ident using root's group permissions, users may read the first 16 (excluding initial whitespace) bytes of wheel-accessible files. All released versions of FreeBSD prior to the correction date including FreeBSD 3.5.1 and FreeBSD 4.2 are vulnerable. III. Impact Users can read the first 16 bytes of wheel-accessible files. To determine which may be potentially read, execute the following command as root: # find / -group wheel \( -perm -40 -a \! -perm +4 \) -ls The inetd internal ident server is not enabled by default. If you have not enabled the ident portion of inetd, you are not vulnerable. IV. Workaround Disable the internal ident server, if enabled: comment out all lines beginning with "auth" in /etc/inetd.conf, then restart inetd by sending it a SIGHUP: # killall -HUP inetd V. Solution One of the following: Upgrade the vulnerable FreeBSD system to 3.5-STABLE or 4.2-STABLE after the correction date. To patch your present system: download the relevant patch from the below location, and execute the following commands as root: [FreeBSD 4.2 base system] # fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-01:11/inetd-4.2.patch # fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-01:11/inetd-4.2.patch.asc Verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. # cd /usr/src/usr.sbin/inetd # patch -p < /path/to/patch # make depend && make all install # killall -HUP inetd [FreeBSD 3.5.1 base system] # fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-01:11/inetd-3.5.1.patch # fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-01:11/inetd-3.5.1.patch.asc Verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. # cd /usr/src/usr.sbin/inetd # patch -p < /path/to/patch # make depend && make all install # killall -HUP inetd -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.4 (FreeBSD) Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org iQCVAwUBOnXTplUuHi5z0oilAQFrhQP/QbPbjKwIlhpT50jDhsjKs0NFH7kznkFi SQJ6ZTYOMEGml5CVc9rLUxmSk+FE7hvZAhVu5+Qc+UHniyQnjOVNXaDvICiN6kMz AEs3UQlVK5Hp8QzXikC9Q4wy//yFC+aNhECVW9u0B3k5sAzqitoI7FWexLpcTMFI 1ZWKYOWLo8o= =0Se/ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message