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Date:      Mon, 21 Apr 2014 18:23:07 +0300
From:      Kimmo Paasiala <kpaasial@icloud.com>
To:        Jamie Landeg-Jones <jamie@dyslexicfish.net>
Cc:        freebsd-security@freebsd.org
Subject:   Re: De Raadt + FBSD + OpenSSH + hole?
Message-ID:  <89978872-0943-417C-9A96-9DB24E5D6CB8@icloud.com>
In-Reply-To: <201404210306.s3L36JfU020865@catnip.dyslexicfish.net>
References:  <534B11F0.9040400@paladin.bulgarpress.com> <201404141207.s3EC7IvT085450@chronos.org.uk> <201404141232.s3ECWFQ1081178@catnip.dyslexicfish.net> <53522186.9030207@FreeBSD.org> <201404200548.s3K5mV7N055244@catnip.dyslexicfish.net> <53540307.1070708@quietfountain.com> <20140421000122.GS43976@funkthat.com> <53546795.9050304@quietfountain.com> <201404210306.s3L36JfU020865@catnip.dyslexicfish.net>

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On 21.4.2014, at 6.06, Jamie Landeg-Jones <jamie@dyslexicfish.net> =
wrote:

> "hcoin" <hcoin@quietfountain.com> wrote:
>=20
>> local variables) harms performance.   It's also true doing both of =
these=20
>> things would not fix the flaw that 'opened the window' onto these =
data. =20
>> However it is true that doing so would make the exploit valueless as=20=

>> 'opening a window' onto erased data would reveal nothing and could =
erase=20
>> trojan/virus 'hijack via code-injection then trampoline' =
opportunities.
>=20
> In the heartbleed case, was the bug returning stale freed memory, =
though?
> Couldn't it just as easily have been that the over-read was returning =
any
> other memory that the process has had allocated for other variables - =
data
> that was still in use?

No, the problem was another type of programming error that is endemic in =
C programming. It=92s called failure to validate input parameters before =
using the input parameters or derived values from the input parameters =
as array indices.=20

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bounds_checking

The bug allowed an attacker to request any number of bytes from memory =
that followed the buffer that the client was usually allowed to access =
(depending on how the index was interpreted it might have been possible =
to request memory before the buffer as well). The part of memory that =
followed the buffer very probably contained some very sensitive =
information, possibly secret keys that were loaded in memory (memory =
that was constantly in use and not free()=92d until the process =
terminates) in unprotected form (plain text essentially) for fast access =
during encryption and decryption.

-Kimmo


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