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Date:      Tue, 8 Sep 2015 15:32:28 -0500
From:      Alan Amesbury <amesbury@oitsec.umn.edu>
To:        freebsd-hackers@freebsd.org, xaol@amazon.com
Subject:   Re: Passphraseless Disk Encryption Options?
Message-ID:  <4B1D3515-2C6F-48C2-9773-7E4E9C686135@oitsec.umn.edu>
In-Reply-To: <55ef3eef.qeb%2BJh3sjv8B9NgH%perryh@pluto.rain.com>
References:  <8B7FEE2E-500E-49CF-AC5E-A2FA3054B152@gmail.com> <CADWvR2iv7xz02Fw9b=159%2BSMuphQGRKZsfyy9DDeqGMxn=p1BA@mail.gmail.com> <D214715D.1A32%xaol@amazon.com> <D2147620.1A4A%xaol@amazon.com> <55ef3eef.qeb%2BJh3sjv8B9NgH%perryh@pluto.rain.com>

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On Sep 8, 2015, at 15:02 , Perry Hutchison <perryh@pluto.rain.com> =
wrote:

> I think this is fundamentally impossible* to do, with any real
> security.  It is like stashing a key to your house somewhere in
> the barn:  you think no one else knows where that key is, but
> anyone who figures out what you've done can get in.
>=20
> In Apple's scheme, at least the house key is in a lockbox -- the
> login password is the key to the lockbox -- but even there the
> hard drive encryption is ultimately only as strong as the login
> password.
[snip]

I think there's a difference between Apple's FileVault and FileVault 2.  =
I recall the former booting completely to a login prompt, i.e., the OS =
was running and everything but home directories were accessible once the =
boot process was completed.  Logging in caused home directories to =
become available, probably through using the user's password to decrypt =
a copy of the disk encryption key (as has already been described).  I =
thought there was also a recovery partition.  I could very well be wrong =
about this, though; it's been some time since I saw FileVault.

FileVault 2 appears to encrypt the entire drive, including the OS.  =
Booting the system to its normal state is not possible without user =
interaction; you have to enter your password to allow the boot process =
to decrypt the key that's used to decrypt the rest of the filesystem =
containing the normal operating environment.  It looks like there's no =
recovery partition, either, at least under Yosemite (v10.10.x), even =
though there appears to be one on disk; it doesn't show up as a boot =
option when the option key is pressed at boot.  The only options given =
are to boot from the drive normally (which prompts for a password), or =
boot from the network.

I agree that it seems unlikely to be able to have a system boot without =
user interaction unless the key is stored in plaintext somewhere that =
the boot process can retrieve it... which means it's likely accessible =
to other things, too.


--=20
Alan Amesbury
University Information Security
http://umn.edu/lookup/amesbury




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