Skip site navigation (1)Skip section navigation (2)
Date:      Thu, 12 Dec 1996 09:03:43 -0800
From:      Jim Binkley <jrb@cs.pdx.edu>
To:        freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG
Subject:   Re: Risk of having bpf0? 
Message-ID:  <199612121703.JAA11713@sirius.cs.pdx.edu>
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Thu, 12 Dec 1996 10:31:46 %2B1030." <199612120001.KAA29724@genesis.atrad.adelaide.edu.au> 

next in thread | previous in thread | raw e-mail | index | archive | help

question: does rarpd turn i/fs on in promiscuous mode?  
or can it just use bpf to "read" lan broadcast packets
off of a particular i/f.  The problem with rarpd of course
is that it wants ARP lan/bcast queries and how it is going
to "read those" with ordinary sockets?  Maybe I haven'
t noticed that there is an AF_LINK socket and a way to bind
it to an i/f?   

You may consider the following abstruse, but I don't...  I'm in general
not very thrilled by any networking protocol or sw daemon that
absolutely must use promiscous mode to read all packets in order to
find the occasional packet Z.   Consider the underpowered laptop that
got stuck on a lan where two p166 or sun ultras decide to have a
multimedia festival.  It might be a tad busier than it needs to be.
Consider the near future when said lan may go much faster.  People
commonly use this line of reasoning to explain why multicast is better
than broadcast (better other systems that don't care are less
bothered).  It applies here too.  From a survivability viewpoint, I
believe Bellovin opined somewhere, sometime that every net stack/o.s.
has at least one killer packet out there with its name on it.  Not
necessarily just the famous large ping packet, but any packet.  Why try
to suck them all down just in case you haven't found it yet?  It is not
unreasonable to expect network protocol designers to minimize such
needs.  It is not unreasonable to expect o.s. designers to make i/fs so
that routing daemons (which is what rarpd is in a tiny way) can have
reasonable i/fs to get at stuff they need to function.  Bruce Schneier
has pointed out recently in comp.risks that security flaws are mostly
bad sw engineering, not "bad crypto" algorithms.  Old engineering can
be improved I think.

Sorry for the rant! :->

					regards,

					Jim Binkley
					jrb@cs.pdx.edu



Want to link to this message? Use this URL: <https://mail-archive.FreeBSD.org/cgi/mid.cgi?199612121703.JAA11713>