Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2000 23:32:09 -0700 From: "Crist J. Clark" <cristjc@earthlink.net> To: Bart van Leeuwen <bart@ixori.demon.nl> Cc: James Wyatt <jwyatt@rwsystems.net>, Jean-Claude STAQUET <jcs@polyflow.be>, freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: allow access of root user Message-ID: <20000725233208.A307@pool0460.cvx20-bradley.dialup.e> In-Reply-To: <Pine.BSF.4.21.0007251638050.21495-100000@isengard.ixori.demon.nl>; from bart@ixori.demon.nl on Tue, Jul 25, 2000 at 04:41:03PM %2B0200 References: <Pine.BSF.4.10.10007250855560.19714-100000@bsdie.rwsystems.net> <Pine.BSF.4.21.0007251638050.21495-100000@isengard.ixori.demon.nl>
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On Tue, Jul 25, 2000 at 04:41:03PM +0200, Bart van Leeuwen wrote: > Uhm, telnetting in as a user and suing to root has exactly the same > danger, your password goes over the net in plaintext. > > If you want to prevent that consider using ssh instead. > Also note that when using rsh you prevent root from logging in for > interactive access, but an rsh -l root <machine> <command> will still > work. > > To be honest, I never really saw the point of disallowing this except for > the simple good habit of never using the root account at all, and only > becomming superuser when you really really have to. Two words: Audit trail. Since so many academic and business machines have multiple administrators, i.e. multiple people who own root, knowing _who_ is actually root is vital for a number of reasons. Direct console logins by root should be discouraged on such machines as well. (When I hear about people leaving root logged in at a console with a GUI waiting to be exploited. "But I locked the screensaver!" Ahhh!) -- Crist J. Clark cjclark@alum.mit.edu To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message
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