Skip site navigation (1)Skip section navigation (2)
Date:      Mon, 16 Aug 1999 23:48:46 -0700 (PDT)
From:      "Rodney W. Grimes" <freebsd@gndrsh.dnsmgr.net>
To:        geoffr@is.co.za (Geoff Rehmet)
Cc:        current@FreeBSD.ORG
Subject:   Re: Dropping connections without RST
Message-ID:  <199908170648.XAA12148@gndrsh.dnsmgr.net>
In-Reply-To: <19990817053636.68405.qmail@rucus.ru.ac.za> from Geoff Rehmet at "Aug 17, 1999 07:36:36 am"

next in thread | previous in thread | raw e-mail | index | archive | help
> Rodney W. Grimes writes :
> > > 
> > 
> > Now what would a box with so much security concern such that
> > it needed this knob be doing running an ftp session.... though
> > your point is valid and acceptable for low security boxes.  And
> > I can see the real benifit that having this knob for those boxes
> > would be, since it would mean not having to spend the care and
> > attention to create a proper firewall rule set.
> > 
> > The idea is okay in the general since, this is an easy knob to
> > add, it would increase the security of some boxes, and not require
> > great configuration pains of writting ipfw rules.
> ....
> > 
> > IMHO, this know would give some folks a false since of security,
> > but not so much that I would argue about keeping it out.  
> 
> I never intended this idea as a replacement for ipfw, but rather
> as a simple setup, which can be done to make a SMALL improvement
> in security, and just make the lives of inquisitive or nasty people
> a little harder.  Maybe I will eventually decide I want ipfw on some
> of the boxes concerned, but that is trickier on machines like
> public ftp servers.  Also, the machines concerned already sit
> behind a packet filtering firewall setup, which is being slated for
> a $100000 upgrade over the next year anyhow, so this is not for
> machines that act as any primary line of defense.
> 
> I'm also making the assumption that the machines concerned are being
> looked after by competent admins.  (A lot to assume sometimes.)
> 
> It seems, though, that there are no serious objections to this kind
> of feature.  I was thinking of calling it
> net.inet.tcp.blackhole, and
> net.inet.udp.blackhole

This is an ACK.  I like those names, the idea is okay given that
the documentation for it reflects what has been discussed here in
this thread so folks can understand this is a very simple security
measure.

And it works just like a blackhole route does... if no more specfic
route exists we send the packet to a bit bucket, now someone want
to make the routing code under ``port routes'' :-) :-)...

> 
> rather than "drop_in_vain".  Any advances on that.  I never quite
> cottoned onto the "in vain" bit - it seems a bit obscure, personally,
> I prefer the idea of the machine behaving like a black hole -
> refused connections no longer "reflect" off it. :-)

Perhaps one more word in the mib name to reflect that it applies
to sockets without listners is all I can think of, but not sure
what to add to the name to make this clear.  mib's tend to be
breif anyway.


-- 
Rod Grimes - KD7CAX - (RWG25)                    rgrimes@gndrsh.dnsmgr.net


To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org
with "unsubscribe freebsd-current" in the body of the message




Want to link to this message? Use this URL: <https://mail-archive.FreeBSD.org/cgi/mid.cgi?199908170648.XAA12148>